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A. Introduction 
TRANSDUCTIVE RE:ASONING AND THE TEACHING 
OF 
CONDITIONAL LOGIC TO CHILDREN 
The ability to make acceptable inferences is central to almost 
every educational activity. This kind of reasoning is so closely 
related to problem solving and intelligence that, as Sternberg (1982) 
points out, it is often very difficult to tell the three apart. 
This· report focuses upon a body of literature pertaining to 
1 
. No textNo text1 
children's conditional reasoning ability, a type of deductive reasoning. 
The literature is surveyed from two main perspectives: 1) natural-
cultural influences - to what extent can childreu do conditional reasoning 
without direct instruction in it and 2) influences of instruction - what 
are the affects of direct and indirect instruction in the principles of 
conditional reasoning upon the child's ability to do conditional reasoning? 
No text No text
In addition, an important thread which runs through many of the 
studies is exposed. This thread shows that a great number of children 
utilize the conditional statement as if it were a biconditional state-
ment. That is to say, they interpret the conditional statement in a 
biconditipnal manner. Furthermore, there is some evidence to indicate 
that this interpretation is not a truth-functional one. 
2 No text
Conditional logic is a type of propositional logic that utilizes the 
logical connectives, "if", "if-then", "only if", and "if and only if" to 
connect antecedent and consequent propositions (represented by "p" and 
"q", respectively). I focus my study upon the "if-then" connective since 
"if p then q" (called the conditional statement) is a fairly connnonly 
I 
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used locution in ordinary discourse. In addition, it is often used to 
reflect deductive necessity: a conclusion follows necessarily from a 
premise or set of premises by virtue of the formal structure of the 
premise(s) and conclusion without appeal to empirical evidence. 
Logicians have agreed that the binary truth function representing 
the conditional statement renders the statement true for all truth value 
combinations of its antecedent and consequence except when pis true and 
q is false. This interpretation of the conditional statement is called 
material implication (or material conditional),. Ennis and Paulus (1965) 
identify twelve principles of conditional logic. However, only the four 
most widely researched principles are considered in this review. They 
can be viewed as corresponding to four conditional arguments
Consider the conditional statement as the first premise in a two 
premise argument which has as its second premise the affirmation or 
denial of either the antecedent or consequence of the first premise. The 
conclusion of the argument is either the affirmation or denial of the 
proposition which is not present in the second premise. Of these four 
possible arguments two are valid arguments (i.e., the conclusion follows 
logically from the premises) and two are invalid (i.e., the conclusion 
does not follow logically from the premises). The arguments and the 
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conditional principles corresponding to them. are (given the conditional 
statement, "if p then q." as the first premise): 
1. Forward Conditional. (Modus Ponens) The affirmation of the antece-
dent (p) implies the affirmation of the consequent (q). 
2. Inversion. The denial of the antecedent (p) does not by itself 
imply the denial of the consequent (q). 
3. Conversion. The affirmation of the consequent (q) does not by 
itself imply the affirmation of the antecedent (p). 
4. Contraposition. (Modus Tollendo Tollens) The denial of the conse-
quent (q) implies the denial of the antecedent (p). 
Principles 1 and 4 are called validity principles because a 
particular conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. Principles 
2 and 3 are called fallacy principles because no conclusion follows 
necessarily from the premises and to assert one,is to draw a falacious 
inference. 
The correct utilization of the principles of conditional logic in 
ordinary. discourse is an important part of reasoning logically. Logical 
reasoning (i.e., the.drawing of valid inferences and correctly judging 
whether or not a statement follows from other statements necessarily) is 
thought to be an essential part of critical thinking. See Ennis (1962) 
3 
and Smith (1957). Conditional statements play a significant role in 
discourse associated with such things as explanation and argumentation. 
Laws, causal relationships, possibilities as well as evidence relation-
ships are frequently expressed in terms of conditional statements. 
The interpretation of the conditional statement is not without 
controversy. There is some empirical. evidence that the conditional 
statement is interpreted in a manner other than material conditional. 
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Studies show that many children tend to interpret the conditional 
statement as if it were a biconditional statement. 
4 
The "if p only if q" locution (called a biconditional statement) is 
considered by logicians to be true whenever the truth values of the 
antecedent and consequence are identical and false whenever these truth 
values are different (material equivalence or biconditional interpreta-
tion). Thus, if the conditional statement ("if p then q") is interpreted 
in a biconditional manner then the conclusions drawn fallaciously under 
the material conditional interpretation become validly drawn con-
clusions. Thus, Principles 2 and 3 cease to be fallacy principles. 
In addition to the interpretation controversy, there exists a 
controversy as to whether or not the "if-then" connective can truly be 
considered a truth-functional connective. It is important to note that 
the literature reviewed here deals with the ordinary language usage and 
interpretation of conditional statements and does not consider the 
formal aspects of logical conditionals. See Barker (1969) for a formal 
analysis. 
The studies reviewed here show, for the most part, that children 
do much better on the validity principles than on the fallacy principles 
and efforts at teaching the principles of conditional logic have largely 
been unsuccessful. However, there is some evidence of increasing success 
on both validity and fallacy principles with age and developmental level. 
There is, in these studies, a thread that suggests that many children 
in the concrete operational state of cognitive development interpret the 
conditional statement in a biconditional sense. This would account, to 
some degree, for the differential performance on the validity and fallacy 
principles. This is not to say, however, that children necessarily inter-
pret the conditional statement truth-functionally. I note that some of 
the results of empirical research can be explained on non-logical (non-
truth-functional) grounds. In fact, there is some evidence that "trans-
ductive" reasoning operates in these circumstances. According to Piaget, 
transductive reasoning is not true deduction because the tendency is to 
juxtapose things - to make associate "and" connections rather than ascribe 
logical necessity to the situation. 
Sixteen studies spanning a twenty year period are presented in.varying 
degrees of detail and are separated and synthesized by three Analysis sections. 
B. The Research-I 
1. Pre-1960 Research 
Although a few studies show that children between the ages of 5 and 
10 years can at least do some propositional logic, none of the studies 
focus upon any of the individual principles of conditional logic. See 
Bonser (1910), Burt (1919), Winch (1921), Moore {1929), Woodcock (1941) 
and Donaldson (1963). Although Donaldson's study is chronologically 
post-1960, its spirit is pre-1960. In fact, psychologists appear to have 
sorely.neglected the area of logical reasoning in general. For a review 
of the logical reasoning literature to 1929 see Moore (1929), to 1943 
see Robitaille (1943). Wilmoth (1973) reviews ~he literature since 1920 
and includes children's logical reasoning. Morgan and Morgan summarize:
During the last 50 years no systematic and comprehensive approach has been undertaken by them [psychologists] toward these problems 
[logical reasoning]. We made a careful search of the literature 
.since 1927 and found 21 references to experimental studies of 
logical reasoning, and we were rather generous in our 
interpretation of what constitutes an experimental study. (Morgan 
and Morgan, 1953, 400) 
We begin this survey with the study by Shirley Rill (1961) which was 
highly touted by Suppes and Binford (1965), revised by O'Brien and 
Shapiro (1968; 1970) and which began a tradition highlightedby Ennis's 
Cornell Critical Thinking Project. Out of the Hill-Ennis tradition came 
a number of research endeavors, each adding something to our knowledge 
of the young child's conditional reasoning abilities. A slightly 
No text
different approach began in Europe with Matalon(1962) and Peel (1967).
\ 
This approach postulated non-standard truth functional explanations for 
children's conditional reasoning abilities. 
Finally, an approach by Wason and Johnson-Laird and their followers, 
although dealing mainly with adult subjects, established yet another 
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tradition which is useful in viewing the problem. From the studies 
examinmed here we come to see the important role that the proper 
interpretation and assessment of the conditional statement plays. 
Evidence is gathered for a biconditional-like interpretation of the 
conditional statement rather than the standard material conditlonal 
interpretation. 
2. Hill (1960) 
The purpose of Hill's study was 
••• to examine the abilities of first, second and third grade 
children to derive valid logical inferences from sets of 
verbal premises • 
6 
••• [and to answer the question] to what extent have these rules of 
inference been incorporated into the cognitive equipment of 
children in the early elementary school years? (Hill, 1960, 1-2) 
It should be noted that Hill's subjects were asked merely to 
"recognize" logically valid conclusions and did not actually derive 
· these conclusions in any constructive sense. Also, the rules of formal 
logic provided Hill with a conceptual model for "c.orrect" deductive 
thinking: 
It is assumed that the relations dealt with by formal logicians are 
not just the esoteric possessions of professional logicians but are 
commonly accepted modes of correct thinking and that growth in 
logically correct thinking in children is the result of the acqui-
sition ••• of the basic principles of logical theory. (ibid., 6) 
No text
No text
We shall see later that this assumption by Hill leads to great 
difficulties in trying to reconcile the empirical evidence reported in 
some of the studies surveyed here. 
Hill's 100 item test consisted of three subtests: classical 
No text
syllogisms, logical quantification with 'two-place predicates, and 
sentential logic (60 items). Our only concern is with the latter subset. 
All of these subtest items consisted of two premises, a question and two 
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possible responses ("YES" and "NO"). The test items required the subject 
to make a discrimination between a necessary conclusions (i.e., valid) 
and the negation of a necessary conclusion. These two types of 
conclusions are evenly distributed over the 60 test items. 
A typical test item in the sentential logic subtest was: 
If this is Room 9, then it is the fourth grade. 
This is Room 9. 
Is it fourth grade? 
a. YES b. NO 
The content of the items were familiar but not suggestive and the 
vocabulary was deemed appropriate for the grades tested. A variant of 
the above test had the second premise and both the antecedent and 
consequent of the first predicate negated. 
aThe overall test reliability coefficient was 0.90 with no subtest 
reliabilities reported. Hill's sample consisted of 270 middle-class and 
middle-income six, seven and eight year olds who were divided into three 
groups of 25 males and 25 females each. A fourth group of 20 eight year 
olds who were advanced readers was utilized to check for reading effect. 
The Standard Group (I) received no correction to test responses. The 
Reinforcement Group (II) received the correct answer after each response 
and the Baseline Group (III) received no reinfotcement but the first 
premise in each item was eliminated to check for content effect. Table 
l, below, shows the categories of sentential logic that Hill tested. 
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TABLE 1 
CATEGORIES OF SENTENTIAL LOGIC TESTED BY HILL 
1. Modus Ponendo ponens 
2. Modus tollendo. ponens 
3. Modus tollendo tollens 
4. Law of hypothetical Syllogism 
5. Hypothetical Syllogism and Tollendo Tollens 
6. Tollendo tollens and tollendo ponens
7. Ponendo pones and tollendo tollens 
Hill found that the mean percentage of correct responses for ages 
6, 7 and 8 were 74.30, 80.42 and 85.54, respectively. In addition, Hill 
found that the percentage of correct responses over all principles and
over all grades were above 74 in all but three cases (and in these cases 
none was lower than 65). This led Hill to conclude: 
The high percentage of successful responses of a.11 standard 
••• suggests that the children in the age group six through 
years are able to recognize valid conclusions derived from
hypothetical premises. (ibid., 50) 
groups 
eight 
For both the overall sentential logic scores and for the individual 
test items, Hill found highly significant F ratios beyond the 0.001 
level for age. The same held true for the other two subtests, leading 
Rill to conclude that logical ability increases with age. Also, Hill 
found that Groups I and II differed significantly at the 0.01 level on 
the overall test and concluded that "determinant reinforcement" improved 
performance in recognizing logically valid conclusions and that Group II 
"learned" to use logical principles. In addition, an item analysis 
I 
revealed that the addition of a negated proposition had a significant 
effect (beyond the 0.001 level) on the difficulty of the item. 
Hill concluded that her research showed that children in the 
concrete operations stage have the" ••• ability to recognize valid 
conclusions derived from hypothetical premises." (ibid., 69) Finally, 
Robert H. Seidman 
Hill's analysis showed that there were no statistically significant 
differences between male and female mean scores. 
Suppes (1964; 1965) and Suppes and Binford (1965), citing Hill's 
study claimed that six, seven and eight year olds: 
••• are able to deal very effectively with verbal premises that 
call for hypothetical reasoning and are by no means limited to 
'concrete' operations. (Suppes and Binford, 1965, 34) 
3. O'Brien and Shapiro (1968) 
9 
O'Brien and Shapiro believed that the particular "behavioral 
manifestations" of hypothetical-deductive thought examined by Hill were 
too narrow. Hill's subjects were called upon only to recognize logical 
conclusions (or negations of logical conclusions) and not to test the 
conclusion's logical necessity. O'Brien and Shapiro utilized two 
No text
measuring instruments. Test A was identical to Hill's test and Test B 
was the same as Test A, except that: 
(1) 33 of the original 100 items viere 'opened up' so that no 
necessary conclusions followed from the premises, and (2) for 
every item in Test B, a 'NOT ENOUGH CLUES' option was added 
to the 'YES' and 'NO' response clues provided in Test A. 
(O'Brien and Shapiro, 1968, 533) 
For example, the sample item given in the Hill study now looks like 
this: 
If this is Room 9, then this is fourth grade. 
This is not Room 9. 
Is it fourth grade? 
a. YES b. NO c . NOT ENOUGH CLUES 
Hill's test had 50 items keyed "YES" and SO items keyed "NO". Test B 
had 34, 33 and 33 items keyed "YES," " NO" and "NOT ENOUGH CLUES," 
respectively. Twenty-five subjects (12 male and 13 female) from a school 
in an upper-middle-class suburb were randomly assigned to each of two 
tests at each age-grade level. Unlike the Hill study, this study did not 
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evaluate the effect of reinforcement on logical abilities and did not 
consider the effects of visual and oral test presentations. 
10 
Test A analysis confirmed almost all of Hill's findings except that 
a Scheffe's 'a posteriori' test showed signficant differences only 
between the means of the 6 year olds and those of the seven and eight 
year olds. This result held for the sentential logic items. For Test B, 
no statistically significant difference was detected between age level 
means except for the 33 altered items (significant at the 0.05 level). 
The difference between the subject's performance on the two tests and on 
the sentential part of the two tests were significantly different with 
Test Blower than Test A at all age levels. This led O'Brien and Shapiro 
to conclude that: 
Children of the same age ••• experience great difficulty in 
testing the logical necessity of a conclusion, and they show 
slow growth in this ability. (ibid., 537) 
It is interesting to note that the performance on the 33 open items in 
Test B was, at all grade levels, below chance. 
O'Brien and Shapiro conclude that contrary to Suppes' claim: " ••• 
hypothetical-deductive ability cannot at all be taken for granted in 
children of this age." (ibid., 539) Like Hill, there were no significant 
differences due to sex or to ageXsex interactions
4. Shapiro and O'Brien (1970) 
In this study, the same tests given in O'Brien and Shapiro (1968) 
were administered to subjects over a wider age-grade range (grades 1 
through 8, ages 6 through 13) in an upper-middle-class suburban school. 
There were 48 randomly selected subjects at each grade level. 24 (12 
males and 12 females) were randomly assigned to receive Test A and the 
rest were assigned Test B. 
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Once again, analyses of Test A confirmed many of Hill's original 
findings for grades l through 3. Scheffe's 'a posteriori' tests showed 
that statistically significant differences (0.05 level) existed between: 
the grade l mean and that of each of the other grades and the grade 4 
mean and those of grades 6 and 8. Although within each of these stages 
no statistically significant differences between grade-age means 
existed, every one of the older age level means were significantly 
higher than any of the means at the prior age stages. 
Further analysis found that for every age-grade level the total test 
means for Tests A and B differed significantly. In each case, Test B 
total means were quite a bit lower than Test A means. Analysis of 
covariance on the 33 altered items and the 67 unaltered items showed 
that these test differences were primarily due 'to the differential 
performance on the the 33 altered items •. With respect to the 33 altered 
items, statistically significant differences appeared at each of the 
grade-age levels and in every case the Test B mean was "substantially 
lower" than the Test A mean. These results confirm the findings in the 
O'Brien and Shapiro (1968) study. 
Shapiro and O'Brien examined the responses given for the 33 open 
items in Test Band found that an intriqui~g pattern emerged. Out of all 
of the items in the sentential logic subtest, 16 were of the "if-then" 
conditional form. Shapiro and O'Brien found that a great many subjects 
"consistently .. interpreted the "if-then" conditional statement as the 
bicondi tional s ta temen t, "if and only if.:· Using this bicondi tional 
interpretation, they rescored the subject's responses. The results are 
given in Table 2 and are taken from Shapiro and O'Brien (1970, 828). 
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TABLE 2 
FREQUENCY OF CORRECT RESPONSES "IF-THEN" OPEN ITEMS IN TEST B 
(Shapiro and O'Brien, 1970) 
Key 
Grade/Age "If-Then" "If and Only If" 
1/6 12 320 
2/7 14 316 
3/8 26 310 
4/9 55 289 \ 
5/10 58 298 
6/11 70 298 
7 /12 90 272 
8/13 137 244 
12 
Chi-squared tests of the frequencies are not appropriate here 
because of the lack of independence. However, the considerable 
differences are quite apparent. Note that the number of biconditional 
responses decreases with increasing age and that the number of "if-then'" 
responses increases with ·increasing age. Shapiro and O'Brien remark: 
This pattern suggests that as children get older, they tend to 
sWi,tcl\ from a child's logic interpretation to one which is 
consistent with mathematical logic. (ibid., 828) 
Since the authors believe that their tests (and Hill's) measure 
hypothetical-deductive thinking, they conclude that their results: 
••• suggest that hypothetical deductive thinking - at least 
that which is consistent with math.ematical logic - cannot at 
No text No text No text No text
all be taken for granted in students!' of elementary-school 
age. (ibid., 829) 
It is possible, Shapiro and O'Brien concede, that children 6 to 13 years 
of age follow a "consistent 'child logic'·· (a material conditional 
No text
interpretation of the conditional statement) which differs from "'adult' 
mathematical logic" (a biconditional interpretation). This is a sug-
gestion that will gain in importance as this literature survey proceeds. 
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S. Ennis and Paulus (1965) 
a. The Experiment 
This study (hereafter, Ennis), massive in its scope and precise in 
its objectives, paved the way and provided a paradigm for a number of 
subsequent investigations. The study focused upon the "natural-cultural" 
development of logic mastery and the "readiness" for mastery of logic of 
students in grades 5 through 12 (10 years to 18 years of age). Since a 
version .of this test is used in my study, a thorough examination is 
presented here. 
The readiness question was concerned with the ages at which and the 
extent to which youngsters were ready to master logic. This involved the 
deliberate instruction in various logical principles. The natural-
cultural developmental question was concerned with the ages at which and 
extent to which youngsters mastered logic without the benefit of 
instruct.ion in logic. Ennis delineates /twelve principles of conditional 
logic arguments and twelve principles of class logic arguments for test-
ing. We are interested in only the first four principles of conditional 
logic: Forward Conditional, Inversion, Conversion and Contraposi tion. No text
Conditional logic was tested for at grade levels 5, 7, 9, and 11 
in two schools. LTD stands for "logic deliberately taught" at school L 
LNDT-1 and LNDT-2, stand for "logic not deliberately taught" in 
schools 1 and 2., respectively. 
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Ennis devised The Cornell Condi tional-Reasoniong Test, Form X which 
contained 72 items in 12 item groups (corresponding to 12 conditional 
logic principles) of 6 items each. The six items of any one group were 
scattered throughout the paper and pencil test. Getting at least 5 of 
the 6 items in an item group correct was deemed a sufficient condition 
for probable mas tery of the principle associated with the item group. 
Getting at least 4 correct was judged to be a probable necessary 
condition of mastery. See Ennis (1964) for his theory of "operational 
definition." 
The Cornell Conditional Reasoning Test, Form X (hereafter, "test") 
includes three content components for each item group: the concrete 
familiar (4 items), the symbolic (1 item), and the suggestive component 
(1 item). The concrete familiar (CF) items are things that are not 
abstract and are reasonably familiar to the test population: 
JT]here is no reason to believe/ that a subject will, because of 
background factual knowledge, accept or reject the conclusion of 
concrete familiar items. (Ennis, 1965, VIII-10) 
Example l is a concrete familiar item for Principle 2 (Inversion). 
Suppose you know that 
If the automobile in the parking lot belongs to Mr. Brown, then 
it is black. 
The automobile in the parking lot doesn't belong to Mr. Brown. 
Then would this be true? 
The automobile isn't black. 
Example 1. Concrete Familiar Example for Principle 2. 
("MAYBE," as explained in the test directions, means "not enough 
clues to answer y~s or no). 
Symbolic component (SY) items use symbols (not words) to refer to 
objects in the sentences. See Example 2. Suggestive component (SU) 
items are such that the truth status of the conclusion of the argument 
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differs from the validity status of the argument. See Example 3. 
Suppose you know that 
If there is an X, then there is a Y. 
There is not an X. 
Then would this be true? 
There is not a Y 
A. YES 
B. NO 
C. MAYBE 
Example 2. Symbolic Component Example of Principle 2. 
Suppose you know that 
If whales are birds, then they can fly. 
Whales aren't birds. 
Then would it be true? 
Whales can't fly 
A. YES 
B. NO 
C. MAYBE 
Example 3. Suggestive Component Example of Principle 2. 
15 
The test directions ask whether the conclusions would be true on the 
assumption that nothing but the premises are known. The three possible 
answers are explained in Table 3. Table A-1 exposes the logical form of 
the test items. Subjects are assumed by Ennis to have mastered the 
principle of double negation, Le., two negatives result in a positive 
statement. 
TABLE 3 
POSSIBLE TEST ANSWERS 
A. YES: It must be true. 
B. NO: It can't be true.
C. MAYBE: It may be true or it may not be true. You weren't 
told enough to be certain whether it is "YES" or 
.. NO ."
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b. Natural-Cultural Results 
Let us now consider Ennis's results concerning the natural-cultural 
development of the ability to understand conditional logic. Ennis 
isolates four major features of Piaget's theory with respect .to the 
formal operational period: 
••• possession of the truth-validity characteristic, ability 
to operate within the framework of a combinatorial system, 
ability to control variables, and ability to do propositional 
logic •••• (ibid., V-8) 
Ennis's study deals with the first and fourth of these features 
because they, according to Ennis, are "clearly" related to the ability 
to do deductive logic. His results can be summarized in five parts. 
1. Table A-2 together with Tables A-3 and A-4 show that there is 
development in logical ability with age. 
2. Ennis was unable to definitively answer the question of whether 
there existed stages in the learning of the logical principles. His 
results were too inconclusive. 
3. Consider the question: is conditional logic mastered by age 11-12 
(grades 5 and 6)? Seventh graders clearly did not master the fallacy 
principles (2 and 3) and do not show great mastery of the validity 
principles (1 and 4). This can be seen in Table,A-4. When we consider 
No text
all 12 principles, grades 5 and 7 have mean pretest scores of 42 and 52, 
respectively, out of a possible 99. It appears that on the whole, the 12 
principles tested for by Ennis were not mastered by subjects at this 
grade level. The mean difficulty indices for all 12 items, indicate that 
I 
No textconditional reasoning is not mastered by age 11-12. Despite a large 
improvement from grade 5 to 11, the latter group seems not to have 
mastered conditional reasoning according to the Ennis criteria. 
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4. Ennis answers, "partly," to the question of whether the truth-
validity characteristic is achieved by age 11-12. This characteristic is 
represented by the suggestive component items where the truth status of 
the conclusion is different from the validity status of the argument. 
For grades 5 and 7, the mean difficulty indices for the SU items are 
4la3 and 53.4, respectively. For grades 11 and 12, the indices are 60 
and 70, respectively. Thus, although the truth-validity characteristic 
is partially achieved at age 11-12 and to a greater extent by age 18, it 
is not completely achieved at any age. 
5. Is the acquistion of conditional logic differentially developed? 
This question-has a number of interesting aspects. First I look at the 
logical principles and then at the three kinds,of item components. 
The fallacy principles (Principles 2 and 3) are clearly differenti-
ated from the validity principles (Principles land 4) by the raw 
scores, the difficulty indices and the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion percentages. In fact, the fallacy groups have the four lowest mean 
difficulty indices. The same holds true for the necessary and sufficient 
condition percentages with but one minor exception. Some of the largest 
improvements across grades are made for the fall~cy groups. 
A statistical comparison (Tukey test and t-tests) between the mean 
difficulty indices of the three item components show the greatest 
development is on the suggestive component, followed by the concrete 
familiar and lastly the symbolic. None of the differences are statistic-
ally significant. Ennis speculates that the non-significant differences 
between the concrete familiar and suggestive components might be because 
the suggestive component is a part of all conditional items, due to 
their "iffy" nature: 
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What the subject is asked to suppose in the conditional statement 
on the conditional reasoning test is not simply that something is 
the case but rather that, on another supposition (the if-clause) 
something would be the case. 
But with the concrete familiar conditional statements, what he is 
working with, though he might well believe it to be true, is the 
implication of another supposition. Thus he is forced to think in 
terms of what is implied, rather than what is true. (ibid., V-39) 
Ennis found no significant differences between CF and SY components. 
He postulates that this may be due to the way the symbols (letters) were 
used. The test statements refer to the existence or non-existence of 
letters and this is presumably no more difficult than dealing with 
familiar categories. Finally, the order of difficulty is the same as in 
Wilkins (1928), in ascending order: CF, SU and SY. 
c. Direct Teaching of Logic Results 
The second part of Ennis's study dealt with the mastery of proposi-
tional logic (strictly, Ennis measured "readiness" to master logic). In 
short, the LDT's were taught the co,nditional logic principles for 15 
days, one school period of 50 minutes each day and were given the post-
test (identical to the pre-test) six weeks later. Ennis found that 5th 
and 7th graders were not ready to master the logical principles and that 
the 11th graders made great improvements. These improvements were quite 
evident among the fallacy principles and occurred amongst the validity 
principles as well. Let us now look at jus t what conditional logic the 
subjects learned. 
Total Scores. Ennis adjusted the means by analysis of covariance, 
partialling out IQ and pre-test scores,, and found that there was no 
significant difference for grades 5 and 7 (on all 12 principles) but 
that the LNDT-1 and LDT show significant differences for 9th and 11th 
grade results. The 9th grade results favor the LNDT's whereas the 11th 
grade results favor the LDT's. 
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Component Scores: The 11th grade LDT's did significantly better on 
all three components scores than the LNDT's but there was a significant 
difference favoring the LNDT-l's for the concrete familiar component. 
Item Group: For grade 11, the fallacy items and the Contraposition 
item significantly favor the LDT's. There is a lack of any great 
improvement for the Forward Conditional and for grade 5, it is only the 
fallacy item, Conversion, that shows a significant difference for-the 
LDT's. 
Ennis concludes, that on the basis of his study: 
[T]here is not much point in trying to teach conditional 
logic in elementary and lower secondary [schools]. 
Furthermore, these results suggest that the things that 
can be taught are the fallacies, contrapostion to some 
extent, and perhaps the validity of affirmation of the 
antecedent, which might be partly teachable, but also 
seems to develop on its own without deliberate teaching. 
(ibid., VI-24) 
Ennis suggests that for the fallacy items, knowledge of logic was 
not improved but that vocabulary was changed. He posits that perhaps 
"if-then .. was interpreted as the bicondi tional and only later was the 
proper terminology learned through teaching (the "if-then" conditional 
was only one of the twelve principles taught). Ennis does not elaborate 
upon this idea and only notes that it "bears further investigation." 
6. Ennis (1969) 
a. The Experiment 
Here, Ennis attempts to determine whether first, second and third 
graders have mastered and whether they are ready to master four basic 
principles of conditional logic: Inversion, Conversion, Contraposition 
I 
and Transitivity. A basic understanding of the Forward Conditional is 
assumed and checked for throughout the study. Parts of this study 
are reported in Ennis (1971). Three principles are considered here. 
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In this study, the components of the logical principles have been 
narrowed to suppositional and factual because the paper and pencil test 
has been abandoned in favor of a test demanding some apparatus. The 
component restrictions also serve as a way to examine Piaget I s "claim": 
[T]he child cannot reason from premises wi thcmt believing in 
them. Or ev~n if he rea.sons implic.i tly from assumptions which 
he makes his own, he cannot do so from those which are proposed 
to him. (Piaget, 1928, 252) 
' For example, the child is shown a model of a house and is told that 
if a handle on the house is in the~ position, the bell on the house 
works, (if p, then q). This is the Forward Conditional. The child is 
asked to suppose that the handle (now hidden) is up, (p), and then is 
asked whether the bell would work, (q). The child is then asked to tell 
why he answers the way he does. Success in this manner, Ennis claims, 
counts as evidence toward a refutation of Pia.set's above "claim" and is 
an example of a suppositional conditional. After the child responds to 
the suppositiona.l conditional, he is shown the handle in an up position 
(p) and is asked whether the bell works (q) and why. This is termed a 
factual conditional. 
Ennis's developmental question is: 
To what extent have 6-9 year olds of various sorts already 
mastered particular basic principles of conditional logic, 
as a result of natural-cultural forces? (Ennis, 1969, 8) 
Mastery was given an operational definition similar to the one in the 
previous study (Ennis, 1965). 
Total scores simply reflected the ntimber of correct answers because 
no credit was given unless both a correct answer and a good justifi-
cation were given. Mastery of suppositional ability was not sought. The 
readiness question investigated was: 
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To what extent are a variety of children ready to learn the 
basic features of conditional logic? (ibid •• 13) 
The instruction involved a series of 15 audio-tutorial lessons 
designed to impart a knowledge of conditional logic via a science 
content. Three elementary schools (urban, rural and suburban) con-
tributed subjects to the study. Ten students in grades one, two and 
three in each school were randomly chosen to be in the control group 
and an equal number were similarly selected to be in the experimental 
groups. In all but the urban school, the experimental and coritrol 
subjects were drawn from different classrooms. There were thus 30 
subjects for each grade level. 
The test. The study design was a post-test-only control group 
(Campbell and Stanley, 1963). Because of motivational and reading 
problems endemic to primary school children, the individual interview 
technique and concrete apparatus tes~materials were considered 
appropriate. The test is divided into two parts using different test 
material. The house part involves a model house and the chemical part 
involves chemical reactions. 
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The model house has two knife switches (one large and the other 
small) and a push-button switch on the out$ide. A doorbell and a light 
(visible when lit and seen through an open window) are inside the house. 
The child is shown the two handle-switches but is not allowed to know 
the function of the small one. He is allowed to find out that the bell 
does not always ring when the button is pushed. Two possibilities are 
left open for the child: l) the small handle being up implies that the 
bell works and 2) the bell works only when the large handle is up. Table 
4 (from Ennis, 1969, 39) shows the conditional statements that the 
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subjects are asked to reason about on the house part of the test. 
TABLE 4 
HOUSE PART CONDITIONAL STATEMENTS 
1. If the big handle is up, then the bell works. 
2. If the light is on, then the big handle is up. 
3. If the bell does not work, then the big handle is down. 
4. If the big handle is down, then the light is not on. 
The subjects are shown, and thus assume, that the large handle being 
up is a sufficient condition for the bell to work. The existence of the 
second switch, of course, is to provide the child with the knowledge of 
the existence of a specific alternative to consider. 
Table 5 (from Ennis, 1969, 40) shows the conditional statements from 
which the subjects are asked to reason from on the chemical part of the 
test. 
TABLE 5 
CHEMICAL PART CONDITIONAL STATEMENTS 
1. If a white powder is soda, then it bubbles when vinegar is 
added. 
2. If a white powder is sugar, then vinegar added to it turns 
white. 
J. If a liquid is vinegar, then it makes soda bubble. 
4. If a liquid makes soda bubble, t~en it' turns litmus paper red. 
Immediately preceding the chemical part of the test, the subjects 
are shown a number of different reactions with vinegar and unidentified 
white powders. This is done so that they realize that some white powders 
turn vinegar milky and other white powders make vinegar bubble. In 
presenting each question, the tester first teaches or reviews the major 
premise(s) using materials and appropriate pictures. If the subject 
demonstrates a recall of the major premise(s) she is: 
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1. for the suppositional questions, asked to suppose that one part 
of the conditional statement is true (or false). 
2. for the factual questions, shown that one part of the conditional 
statement is true (or false). 
The subject is then given three answers from which to choose: 
1. affirmation of that part of the conditional statement that is 
under consideration, 
2. denial of that part of the conditional statement that is under 
consideration, 
3. neither affirmation nor denial of that part of the conditional 
statement under consideration. 
After the subject responds, the tester asks for a justification of the 
answer. The suppositional form is always asked first. 
Test Structure: Out of a total of 24 items, there are 6 items for 
each of the four principles (each group of 6 items corresponding to a 
principle is an item group). Within each item group, 3 items are 
suppositional and 3 are factual. Table A~5 describes each item. Sub-
scores for the four principles, the fallacy and validity principles, 
suppositional and factual forms and the house and chemical parts (as 
well as total scores) are computed. Probable mastery of a principle is 
judged for a score of 5 or 6, probable non-mastery for a score of 3 or 
less and judgement is withheld for a score of 4. 
No text
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b. Developmental Results 
The results of the control group are shown in Tables A-6, A-7 and 
A- 8 and can be summarized as follows. 
Both Tables A- 6 and A- 7 show that there is considerable variation 
from principle to principle. Table A-8 shows the results of signifi-
cance tests done on the differences among principle scores, between 
suppositional and factual items and between validity and falla~y 
principles. All of the differences are statistically significant at the 
0.05 level. There is a marked difference between the validity and 
fallacy principles with subjects doing much better on the validity 
principles than on the fallacy princples. 
These three tables show that the subjects did consist5ntly better on 
the factual items than on the suppositional items One explanation has 
parallels, in the test-retest situation: students improve even without 
instruction. The subjects were first asked to suppose the minor 
pre:nise(s) and then after answering the test item, were shown the 
facutal counterpart. Another explanation parallels Piaget's claim that 
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it is more difficult for young children to work with possibilities than 
with actual situations. Whatever the explanation, suppositional ability 
was demonstrated by a large number of subjects. 
The Pearson Product Moment correlations for sex, age, SES, IQ and 
dwelling area with the test scores for both the control and experimental 
groups show no significant correlations and almost no correlation 
between sex and anything else. The chronological age correlation with 
total test scores was low and might be due to a plateau in the logical 
development within the age ranges studies, according to Ennis. There 
appears to be a positive relationship between SES and logical ability 
with higher correlations in the control group than in the experimental 
group. Perhaps, as Ennis suggests, the logic instruction made up in 
part, for the SES differences, although the overall effect of 
instruction was nil (see "Readiness Results", below). 
Out of all the correlations, the ones between IQ and conditional 
logic scores were the highest, with verbal IQ the highest. Taking the 
grades separately, these correlations were even higher for second and 
third grades. Finally, no significant difference was found between the 
logic test scores and dwelling area. 
c. Readiness Results 
Ennis concludes that, on th~ basis of the data: 
••• the methods which we used to try to bring about the mastery 
of the four basic principles of conditional logic were not 
successful. (ibid., 64) 
Only one out of 30 comparisons between co;ntrol and experimental groups 
was statistically significant and that one favored the control group 
(suburban subjects on the Contraposition principle). 
Why was the instruction unsuccessful? Ennis offers four possible 
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explanations, rejects the first two and is unable to decide between the 
latter two. 
1. Logical abilities.cannot be hastened, they unfold on their own. 
Ennis notes that in his earlier study (Ennis, 1965), upper secondary 
school children did learn logic. 
2. Children of the ·age range tested (6 to 9 years) cannot learn 
conditional logic principles. However, Tables A-6, A-7 and A-8 show 
that many children have learned conditional logic. 
3. At this age level, conditional logic cannot be taught, even 
though children might acquire it on their own and although older 
children apparently can be successfully taught. 
4. The teaching materials used in the study were inadequate. 
While explanations 1 and 2 can safely be rejected based upon the 
data, there exists no sure way of choosing between 3 and 4. The negative 
results of the readiness study do not necessarily show that children are 
not ready to mas.ter something. Positive resuits on the other hand, show 
that the children are ready for mastery. Thus, the question of whether 
6-9 year olds are ready to learn more. conditional logic than they 
already know remains unanswered. 
c. ~~lysis-I 
The studies examined so far present a somewhat confusing view of the 
conditional reasoning capabilities of young children, particularly those 
in· the concrete operational stage of development. These studies do, 
No text
however, give us some evidence for an al,ternative interpretation of the 
standards against which the subjects were tested. The Shapiro and O'Brien 
(1970) study and aspects .of both of the Ennis (1965; 1969) studies lend 
some support for a biconditional-like interpretation of the conditional 
statement by children. There is some Piagetian theory to support this 
alternative interpretation • 
No textAccording to Piaget's theory of ontogenesis of cognitive processes and 
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structures, the child moves from the concrete operational stage of 
cognitive development to the formal operations stage via reflective 
abstraction. The formal operational child can now operate under a 
"complete combinatorial system" whereas the concrete operational child is 
relegated to mathematical groupings, an incomplete combinatorial system. A 
formal operational child when confronted with a conditional assertion, "if 
p then q." can form a combinatorial system of p and p conjoined with q 
and q: 
2. p .q. 
3. p.q. (1) 
4. p.q. 
and can consider the possibility of 1, 2 and 3 as true. Note that "if p 
then q" is equivalent logically to 
(p.q)v(p.q)v(p.q) (2) 
and (p.q). (3) 
The three conjunctions in (2) together with the negation of (3) form 
the combinatorial system of formal operations. Since the concrete opera-
tional child is unable to form this system, he is unable to consider 
p.q, p.q and p.q as true, given. the "if p then q" conditional statement. 
But which, if any of the conjunctions in (1) would the concrete opera-
tional child consider? Transductive reasoning provides a clue. 
No text
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Transductive reasoning is neither true inductive nor true deductive 
reasoning. It is associative rather than implicative and causal.' For 
the young child, elements visually close tend to be juxtaposed in her 
reasoning. The child moves from particular to particular. As Flavell 
puts it: 
Centering on one s.alient element of an event, the child proceeds 
irreversibly to draw as conclusion from it some other perceptually 
compelling happening. Piaget makes the important point that the 
factual correctness of the child's conclusion ... is by itself no 
guarantee that the mechanism for arriving at it was logical rather 
than transductive. (Flavell, 1963, 160) 
The child who reasons transductively tends to juxtapose elements, 
·thus making associative "and" connections. 
[J]uxtaposition is after all the sign of the complete absence of 
necessity from the thought of the child. The child knows nothing 
either of physical necessity (the fact that nature obeys laws) 
nor the logical necessity (the fact that such a proposition No text
necessarily involves such another). For him everything is connected 
with everything else, which comes to exactly the same thing as 
nothing is connected to anything else. (Piaget, 1928, 60) 
According to Piagetian theory, transductive reasoning is not fully 
extinguished and replaced with logical necessity until the formal 
operations stage is reached (Piaget, 1926; 1928). 
No text
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Thus, the O'Brien and Shapiro (1968) sample test item can be 
translated into "transductive logic" terms. This translation and the next 
are takenfrom Knifong (1974): 
Room 9 and the fourth grade co-occur. 
This is Room 9. · 
Is this the fourth grade? 
a .. YES b. NO 
Transductive logic tells us that the "correct .. response is "YES." "NOT 
ENOUGH CLUES" has no transductive interpretation and thus may be mean-
ingless for the subject. Thus, if transductive logic is operative on the 
original question, the child answers correctly according to the standard 
mathematical logic interpretation, but for the wrong reasons. Note that 
• all of. the studies surveyed thus far,show a notable success on the Forward 
Conditional principle (modus ponens). 
Here is how the Inversion question is translated using transductive 
reasoning: 
Room 9 and the fourth grade co-occur. 
This is not Room 9. 
Is it the fourth grade? 
a. YES b. NO 
Using transductive reasoning, the "correct" response would be "NO," 
which is of course incorrect under the material conditional interpretation 
of the conditional statement. Similar ca~es can be made for Conversion and 
Contra.position. 
This transductive anlaysis shows that the child may very well be 
utilizing a biconditional-like interpretation of the conditional statement 
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in her reasoning. The Shapiro and O'Brien (1970) study gives evidencetror 
this interpretation and the poor showing on the fallacy i terns and the good 
q 
showing on the validity items in the Ennis studies (1965; 1969) also i:Jn.ds 
some support for a transductive explanation. 
Knifong (1974) reexamines some of Ennis's (1969) raw data. See Tal;ile 
6. Since the "MAYBE" (similar to "NOT ENOUGH CLlleS") was so infrequent, 
Knifong excluded them from his statistical analysis. It is not clear just 
why Knifong did not include the Inversion principle in his table. Table 6 
strongly supports the transductive interpretation of the conditional 
statement. Note that for Principle III (Contraposition), the incorrect an-
swer "MAYBE" was chosen about as often as when it represented the .correct 
response in the other two principles (for each grade level). Knifong be-
lieves tha.t this pattern implies: 
••• thatthese children may have been responding from an "I 
don't know" rather than the more sophisticated "I don't know 
and it is impossible to know" understanding of the question. 
(Knifong, 1974, 81) 
Thus, the success on Contraposition that Ennis found 
could very well be attributable to a transductive interpretation. This no-
tion bears further examination, for as Flavell so aptly points out: 
••• the factual correctness of the child's conclusion is by 
itself no guarantee that the mechanis1Jt for arriving at it 
was logical rather than transductive. (Flavell, 1963, 160) 
D. The Research-II 
1. Peel (1967) 
No textThis study lends support for a transductive biconditional-like inter-
1 
preta tion for children's reasoning using' conditional (Peel calls them 
"implication") statements and arguments. This study is important because 
it utilizes a wholly different methodological approach than Ennis, Hill, 
and O'Brien and Shapiro. 
TABLE 6 
PERCENTAGES OF EACH OF THE THREE RESPONSES REFLECTING VARIOUS KEYS 
ON THE SMITH-STURGEON ·CONDITIONAL REASONING TEST (Knifong, 1974) 
Principle I: 
p--)qa 
not p
Question: 
Principle II: 
p-->qa 
.9. 
Question: 
Principle Ill: 
p-->qa 
not q
Question: 
(q) (not q) (maybe) (not p) (p) (maybe) (p) (not p) (maybe) 
First Grade 
(N =53)
Second Grade 
(N = 58) 
Third Grade 
(N = 57) 
Other 
l 
l 
0 
Average for all groups 
(N = 168) 1 
Trans-
ductive 
Logic 
70 
56 
68 
64b 
Source - Ennis et al., 1969 
Math 
Logic 
29 
43 
32 
35b 
Other 
4 
3 
3 
3
Trans-
ductive 
Logic 
No text73 
No text82 
85 
80b
Trans-
ductive 
Ma th and Ma th 
Logic Other Logic 
24 2 72 
15 1 74 
12 4 80 
17b 2 70b
Other 
26 
25 
16 
22b 
a The letters p, q, r, ands are used to represent logical statements, and--> is used to 
represent the logical conditional. 
b For Principles I and II the percentages of responses reflecting the transductive and math logic 
interpretations were not significantly different from their respective averages for all age groups. 
For Principle III the percentage of responses for the (not p) and (maybe) responses were not 
significantly different from their respective averages for all all groups. 
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Peel, by using a gaming technique avoids the pitfalls of purely formal 
implications where the propositions are not necessarily naturally or No text
causually related and avoids quasi-natural settings such as the Ennis
house and chemicals test. Peel creates a novel situation, unaffected by 
previously learned relations (e.g., a parent's admonition: "if you eit 
your supper you'll get a story," smacks of a biconditional admonition) and 
independent of an understanding of propositions masked in the guise of 
ordinary English sentences. 
The game, played between experimenter and child, is extraordinarily 
simple: 
The experimenter has before him a collection of many beads in a 
tin, there being at least 10 each of the four colours, blue, 
yellow, red and green. In another shallow tin is a similar
collection of counters, also made up of ,some 10 each of the same 
colours. The experimenter and the subject face each other with 
their beads and counters before each respectively, and an empty 
box is placed on the table betwe.en them into which they make 
their play. The game consists essentially of the experimenter 
No textdrawing a certain bead, and then the subject drawing a counter 
depending upon the rule of the particular game •••• 
1 • Implicatition: "We may pick any colour we like, but in this game, 
if and whenever I draw a red bead, you are to draw a red counter." 
(Peel, 1967, 83) No text
Ten pairs of draws (with replacement) are made with each of 150 
subjects (only 58 subjects were used for impl.ication, the other subjects 
were tested on the other logical relatio1':Ships1) in random order consisting 
for implication of 6 reds and 4 non-reds by the experimenter. All of the 
experimenter-subject draws (i.e., conjunctions) are recorded. 
Let "R" stand for the initial bead draw by the experimenter and "r" No text No text ________________
stand for the responding counter draw by the subject. "R" and "r" 
\ 
stand for non-r,ed bead and non-red counter draws, respectively. Table 7 
gives the theoretically expected proportions of conjunctions according to 
the material conditional interpretation of the conditional statement and 
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equivalence (biconditional) interpretation. This table also gives the 
experimental resultse 
TABLE 7 
PEEL'S THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
FOR THE FORWARD GAME 
Initial bead draw 
by experimenter: R 
Responding cou;ter 
draw by subject: r r r 
Binary 
Conjunction: Rr Rr Rr 
Truth value according 
to standard meaning true false true 
of implication: 
Truth value according 
to standard meaning true false false 
of equivalence: 
Theoretically expected 
proportion of implication: 1.0 0 o.s 
Theoretically expected 
proportion of equivalence: 1.0 0 0 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Age group: 5+ 0.92 0.07 o.os 
8+ 0 . 99 0.01 0.02 
11+ 0.99 No text0.01 0.03 
R 
r 
Rr 
true 
true 
0.5 
1.0 
0.95 
0.98 
0.97 
Note that the subjects appear to be operating under a biconditional 
' interpretation of the conditional rule when they produce a consequence to 
the antecedent draw made by the experimenter. Peel cites a study by 
Matalon (1962) and claims: 
[T]he results of the implication game link closely with those 
obtained by Ma.talon (1962) who found that implication is 
predominantly read as equivalence. (ibid., 90) 
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The version of the experiment described above is called the forward 
game. Peel played a reverse game with the same subjects. In the reverse
game, the initial bead draw is made by the subject and the experimenter 
No text
responds with a counter draw. The child must decide whether this cou,ier 
draw is correct ("acceptable") or incorrect ("non-acceptable"),,for the 
given implication rule. The theoretically expected proportions for iJ!Wli-
cation a~d equivalence and the experimental results are given in Table 8. 
TABLE 8 
PEEL'S THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
FOR THE REVERSE GAME 
Initial bead 
draw by sub je_ct : 
Bead-counter 
conjuction: Rr 
R 
Rr Rr 
R 
Rr 
Judgment of 
subject: acc. 
non-
acc. acc. 
non-
acc. acc. 
non-
acc. acc. 
non-
acc. 
Theoretically 
expected. 
proportions of: 
Implications:
Equivalence: 
EXPERIMENTALRESULTS
Age group: 5+ 
8+ 
11+ 
1 
1 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.03 
0.01 
0 
,I 
1 
1 
No text
0.99 
1.0 
1 
0 
0.24 
0.58 
0.82 
0 
1 
0.76 
0.42 
0.18 
1 
1 
0.93 
1.0 
0.98 
0 
0 
Note that the Rr conjunction proportion change over age has the 
effect of transforming the equivalence interpretation of the game rule 
into the material conditional interpretation. It is not until 11+ that 
this transformation is fairly complete. 
0.07 
0 
0.02 
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Peel's gaming technique allows us to test inferences from the 
antecedent and enables us to get at the principle of Inversion. Peel's 
results show us that poor results on the Inversion principle, when 
assessed by material conditional standards, may be due to a biconditional 
interpretation of the conditional statement. Improved results are to be 
expected for older age groups (given the results in Table 8) although 
forward game evidence does not support this trend. 
Peel's gaming technique allows us to fit a theoretical model to 
empirical results .. His study lends support to the biconditional 
interpretation of the conditional statment ("rule" for Peel) in the 
concrete operational child and lends credence to a transductive 
interpretation theory of conditional logic reasoning ability in young 
children. 
2. Taplin, et. al. (1974) 
In this study (hereafter, Taplin)/ the findings support the notion that 
logical performance improves with age. Taplin's ingeneous analysis 
suggests that youngsters initially treat the .. if-then" conditional as a 
conjunction, then as equivalence and finally as a material conditional 
statement .. 
Taplin shows, using abstract material (as opposed to the more concrete 
material of Peel and Matalon), that his subjects showed evidence of 
reasoning truth-functionally, but used alternative interpretations of the 
conditional statement. 
i 
Eight fotms of the conditional argument were presented (see Table 9 
from Taplin, 1974) with 12 replications of each of the eight forms. The 
arguments were contained on a slide and letters were used to stand for the 
propositions. 
\ 
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For example: 
A. It there is a Y, then there is an H. 
B. There. is a Y. 
c. There is an H. 
The subjects were asked to assume that the premises were true and to 
evaluate the conclusion as being always correct, sometimes correct or 
TABLE 9 
TAPLIN'S EIGHT FORMS OF CONDITIONAL ARGUMENTS 
(Taplin, 1974) 
Conclusion 
First Second to be 
Name of argument Conclusion Premise Premise Evaluated 
Affirming the No textAffirmative If P, then q p q
antecedent Negative If P, the,n q p q 
Denying the Affirmative If P, then q p q
antecedent Negative If P, then q p q 
Affirmingthe, Affirmative If P, then q q p
consequent Negative If P, then q q p 
Denying the Aff irma tive If P,. then q q p
consequent Negative If P, then q q p 
never correct. Using the material conditional interpretation of the 
No text
conditional statement, the " correct " responses were tallied. Taplin's 
analysis showed a statistically significant effect of grade level, 
F(4,291)•30.45, p<0.001 and a significant effect of type of argument, 
F(7,2037)•198.92, p(0.001. The analysis also showed a significant GradeX 
Argumentinteraction, F(28,2037)•3.00, p<0.001. 
[P]erformance was found to improve around 6 years to college 
level, with the most dramatic change taking place between 11 
and 15 years. (Taplin, 1974,_ 363) 
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If Taplin had stopped at this point his results would have merely 
confirmed the results of a number of other studies. However, Taplin pushed 
on, trying to find the very basis for this observed change and to infer a 
process or function which might be able to account for these changes. To 
do this Taplin makes an inference for each individual subject, based upon 
the subject's responses to eight conditional argument forms, of any truth 
functional interpretation consistent with the responses. This analysis is 
what sets Taplin's study apart from the others considered thus far. 
First, Taplin determines whether the child was "statistically 
consistent" on each form of the conditional arguments, using a binomial 
test (0.05 level). A subject is classified as statistically consistent 
only if he had a preference for a certain res'P?nse above the criterion 
level (0.05). If the subject did not reach the criterion level on any 
argument he was categorized as _statistically inconsistent. Thus, a number 
of "inconsistent" subjects were eliminated from further analysis. 
Next, Taplin infered a truth function for the conditional statement 
"if p then q .. from the responses made by the child to the arguments that 
spe was statistically consistent on: 
Basically this step of the analysis involved the inference of 
truth values for the truth-table repre1senting the meaning of 
the connective that were compatible with the particular 
evaluation of the argument obtained. Pifferent inferences 
apply to different argwnents .. (ibid.,· 365) 
The inferences that Taplin made concerning the truth table values for each 
of the arguments are shown in Table 10 (from Taplin, 1974). 
I 
Taplin's criterion for constructing 'these truth functions was quite 
strict. Note from Table 10 that four estimates are made of the value for 
each of the truth table contingencies. If all. four estimates agreed then 
they were deemed the truth-function for the conditional statement. 
TABLE lO 
INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN ABOUT THE TRUTH-TABLE VALUES 
FOR A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE FROM RESPONSES MADE TO EIGHT CONDITIONAL ARGUMENTS 
(Taplin, 1914) 
Name of Argument 
Affirming the 
antecedent 
Denying the 
antecedent No text
Affirming the 
consequent 
Denying the 
consequent 
Conclusion 
Affirmative 
Negative 
Affirmative 
Negative 
Affirmative 
Negative 
Affirmative 
Negative 
Always Correct 
pq(T) and pq(F) 
pq(F) and pq(T) 
pq(T) and pq(F) 
pq(F) and pq(T) 
pq(T) and pq(F) 
pq(F) and pq(T) 
pq(T) and pq(F) 
pq(F) and pq(T) 
. 
S's Responses to Conclusion 
Sometimes Correct Never Correct 
pq(T) and pq(F) either pq(F) and pq(T) 
or pq(F) and pq(F) 
pq(T) and pq(T) either pq(T) and pq(F) 
or pq(F) and pq(F) 
pq(T) and pq(T) either pq(F) and pq(T) 
or pq(F) and pq(F) 
pq(T) and .pq(T) either pq(T) and pq(F) 
or pq(F) and pq(F) 
pq(T) and pq(T) either pq(F) and pq(T) 
or pq(F) and pq(F) 
pq(T) and pq(T) either pq(T) and pq(F)
or pq(F) and pq(F) 
pq(T) and pq(T) either pq(F) and pq(T)
or pq(F) and pq(F) 
pq(T) and pq(T) either pq(T) and pq(F) 
or pq(F) and pq (F) 
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If, however, there were any disagreements, the child was categorized as 
contradictory. This once again served to narrow down the range of 
subjects. The results of the above analysis are shown in Table 11 (from 
Taplin, 1974) and are quite revealing. 
Grade 
3 
5 
7 
9 
11 
Grade 
3 
5 
7 
9 
11 
TABLE 11 No text. 
PERCENTAGE OF Ss IN EACH GRADE IN EACH CLASSIFICATION 
(Taplin, 1974) 
Statistically consistent on all arguments 
Con- Bicon- Condi- Contra-
junction ditional tional dictory 
19.6 19.6 17.6 
3.7 43.9 13.4 
41.0 9.6 
32.5 10.0 7.5 
23.7 13.1 15.8 
Statistically inconsistent on at least one argument 
Con- Bicon- Condi-- Contra-
junction ditional tional dictory Other 
7.8 9.8 
-
5.9 19.6 
2.4 14.6 9.8 12.2 
3.6 9.6 2.4 ): 14.5 19.3 10.0 12.5 12.5 15.0 
10.5 13.2 15.8 7.9 
Here is what an analysis of Table 11 tells us: 
No text
Total 
56.8 
61.0 
50.6 
50.0 
52.6 
Total. 
43.1 
39.0 
49.4 
50.0 
47.4 
1. In Grade 3, no material conditional. truth functions were inferred, 
but, equal portions of subjects interpreted the conditional argument in a 
conjunctive and biconditional manner. 
2. In Grade 5, the conjuctive and biconditional interpretations 
decreased and increased significantly, respectively (X2(2) = 14.09,
p(0.001). There were still no material conditional interpretations. 
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3. The Grade 7 distribution was not significantly different from the 
Grad~ 5 distribution, but the only Grade 7 conjuctive interpretation 
remaining was 3 .6% of the group initially classified as statistically 
inconsistent. Aside from the 2.4% who were inferred to prefer the material 
conditional truth function the only truth function inferred in Grade 7 was 
the biconditional. 
4. The Grade 9 distribution was significantly different from the Grade 
7 distribution (X~(2)•8.99, p(0.05). Still, the biconditional interpre-
pretation was the highest even thou~h.:its actual percentage has decreased 
from that of Grade 7. Note that the material conditional interpretation 
shows 10% and 12$5% for the consistent and inconsistent groups, 
respectively. 
5. Grade 11 shows a further decrease in the biconditional percentage 
and a slight increase in the percentage of material conditional interpre-
tations. These changes are not statistically significant* 
Taplin's inferential· analysis seems to show that the truth functional 
interpretation changes with age in a manner that appears to account for 
observed performance changes. This intepretive progression (from conjunc-
tive and biconditional interpretations by the third and fifth grade 
students, to a biconditional interpretation for the seventh graders, to a 
biconditional and material conditional interpretation for the ninth and 
eleventh grade subjects) suggests the following interpretation expressed 
succinctly by Staudenmayer and Bourne (1977): 
When faced with if p then q, the younger children link the 
perceptual properties, formally p and q, in an associative 
manner (juxtaposition according to Piaget, 1928). They 
cannot comprehend the possibility of relations between. 
properties that are absent but implied (p and q). As 
children get older they understand that the absence of 
propostions may also have specific relations. Thus, the 
first nonconjunctive interpretation that is achieved is one 
consistent with the [biconditional], where the absence of 
one property implies the absence of the other. Only with 
adolescence does a person achieve the capacity to 
understand the asymmetric truth reiation between p and q 
implied by the [conditional statement], where the second 
property (q) may sometimes occur without the first (p) but 
the first may not occur without the second. (Sta.udenmayer 
and Bourne, 1977, 617) 
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Such an interpretation of Taplin's results posits a "limited 
capacity" Piaget-like model of cognitive development where children can 
only utilize a specific interpretation if they have achieved the requisite 
cognitive level. Thus, the theoretical distinction between formal and 
concrete operations may be reflected in the different interpretive 
strategies employed by the subject's in Taplin's study. 
As for transduction, we could say that the conjunctive interpretation 
reflects simple transduction and that the biconditional interpretation 
reflects a more sophisticated transduction, symmetrical transduction. The 
asymmetrical nature of the material conditional interpretation of 
conditional statements of the form "if p then q" would seem to preclude 
transduction and call for a kind of reasoning structure that is quali-
tatively different from transduction. 
E. Analysis-II 
Peel's and Taplin's studies add s;rong evidence for alternative 
interpretations of the child's conditional reasoning. Taplin's (1974) 
study lends strong support to an explanatory theory which includes the 
Piagetian notion of transductive logic. Piaget (1926; 1928) indicates that 
he found that implicative relations were rarely used prior to age 7-8 and 
hardly at all before 11-12. When they are u~ed, they juxtapose rather than 
i' 
causually link events. Thus, Piaget, as eai:;ly as 1926 seems to suggest 
that the meaning of these kinds of connectives. change with cognitive 
ontogenesis. 
Consider the conjunction relation. He~e one event (or proposition) 
cannot occur without the other also being present. This is the most 
primitive transductive stage. A transductive advance occurs when the link 
between the two events is such that not only do they occur mutually, but 
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whenever one of them is absent, so is the other. This stage conforms to a 
biconditicmal interpretation of the conditional state~ent. Transduction 
becomes the material conditional interpretation when the second event 
(however defined) at times can occur in the absence of the first, but it 
cannot be the case that the first can occur without the second. 
Thus, in one sense, the developmental changes observed by Taplin can 
be considered linguistic and not logical, although logic is always 
present. In another sense, the changes can be considered logical because 
the truth-functional meanings of the conditional connective does seem to 
change with age. We can argue that the material conditional interpetation 
is the more abstract, for as Taplin puts it: 
Now one must consider not only the form 'of the statements but also 
their order. One must determine not only whether the conclusion 
follows from the premises but also whether it is the only 
conclusion that can follow® Quite obviously there is a very close 
relationship here between linguistic and cognitive development. To 
say whether the linguistic change gives rise to the cognitive, or 
visa versa, would be merely speculation based upon the present 
findingso (Taplin, 1974, 372) 
Staudenm.ayer and Bourne (1977) explore the lingusitic and cognitive 
explanatory alternatives using a variant of Taplin's experiment. Piaget's 
theory of cognitive development (and the transductive interpretation 
raised here) posits that the more complejc conditional interpretations 
require the formal operations period of cognitive development. However, 
conventional linguistic development theory (see Brown, 1973) suggests that 
the progression from conjunctive to biconditional to material conditional 
\ 
interpretation depends upon their frequency of occurrence in the experi-
ence of the child and upon the semantic complexity of the propositions. 
These two views appear to be exclusive in the sense that the 
linguistic interpretation of the pr~~ises does not involve the inferences 
needed in the evaluation of the conditional argument's conclusion. Is the 
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linguistic interpretation of the connective primary in development or are 
the cognitive operations central? Stauderunayer and Bourne suggest that 
this formulation of the problem is incorrect. 
To eliminate the assumption that two separate processes are involved 
in reasoning ( .. one to interpret the premises and the other to guide 
reasoning"), Staudenm.ayer and Bourne pose the question in this way: "What 
cognitive operations a.re necessary to make a particular interpretation?" 
It is their belief that in the evaluation of certain arguments, the 
inferences are entailed in the interpretation of the premises. All of the 
above reduces to this: 
[W]e are concerned with clarifying the developmental progression in 
the understanding of the conditional sentence. Does the progression 
reflect a change in preference for some interpretations over others 
with experience? Or, is there some lack of cognitive ability that 
precludes understanding the more complex relations and implications of 
rules like the (material conditional interpretation], even when 
experienced repeatedly in a learning task? (Stuademnayer and Bourne, 
1977, 617) -
Staudenmayer and Bourne's experiment was the same as Taplin's (1974) 
except that a correct response feedback, consistent with particular 
interpretations (i.e., conjunctive, biconditional, material conditional), 
was provided for each trial. Subjects were chosen from grades 3, 6 and 9 
with no control groups. Can subjects learn.1 interpretations that are 
different from those that were shown to be prefered in the Taplin (1974) 
study? Note that no teaching of logical principles is involved here, only 
the exposure to "correct .. interpretations after response trials. 
Staudenmayer and Bourne found that the y~ungest children matched the 
propositions or properties that appeared in the first premise to the 
properties that appeared in the second premise and conclusion. This type 
of juxtaposition was found to decrease with increasing age. 
As a result of their study, Staudenmayer and Bourne concluded that: 
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It seems likely that the youngest children used some form of an 
associative or rote strategy in the reasoning task, similar to 
Evan's (1972) matching bias, making it impossible to keep the 
asymmetry between the propostions straight for the [material 
condi·tional interpretation]. 
On the other hand, some of the older adolescents in the reasoning 
task were probably using a different strategy characte.ristic of 
formal, inferential reasoning since some of them learned the 
[material conditional interpretation]. (ibid., 622) 
Their study and that of. Taplin's supports a transductive 
interpretation of the conditional statement at the pre-adolescent age and 
adds to the notion of a cognitive developmentally significant factor in 
differential interpretations of conditional statements. 
F. The Research-III 
1. paris (1973) 
This study, although not quite as definitive as the previous one, 
adds further evidence to the biconditional interpretation of the 
cond:l,tional statement and argument. Paris's sample are equal numbers of 
white middle-class male and female elementary and secondary school 
students and college freshmen (40 subjects in grades 2, 5, 8, 11 and 
college). 
Eight linguistic connectives were examined: "and,·· "but,·· "both-
and," "neither-nor," "or," "either-or," "if-then," "if and only if-
1, 
then.'' We are concerned only with the latter two connectives. For each
connective, a descriptive propositional sentence was read and a slide 
I 
showing pairs of propositions was simultaneously displayed. These s,lides 
;represented the attributes or truth forms of the verbal propositional 
sentences. See Table 12. 
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TABLE 12 
LINGUISTIC CONNECTIVES, LOGICAL RELATIONSHIPS 
AND ATTRIBUTES 
(Partial from Paris, 1973) 
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Linguistic 
Connective 
Logical 
Relationship 
Attributes (truth forms)
AB AB AB AB 
If-then 
If and only if-then 
Conditional 
Bi.conditional 
T 
T 
F 
F 
T 
F 
T 
T 
The propositional test sentences consist of compound sentences 
formed from two of eight simple sentences used for the testing, and a 
connective. Each picture proposition also had its complement .. For 
instance, one picture might show a boy riding a bicycle. Its complement 
' 
showed a boy standing next to his bicycle. There were four test 
slide-sentence pairs for each connective and the subjects had to judge 
the test sentence as true or false depending upon the value of its 
components determined by the slide. Table 13 shows the "error" patterns 
that are associated with each of the truth attributes, by grade for the 
conditional connective. 
TABLE 13 
PERCENT ERRORS ON THE CONDITIONAL CONNECTIVE IF-THEN 
ACCORDING TO TRUTH FORM AND GRADE 
(Paris, 1973) 
Grade TT TF FT FF 
2 0 17.5 75 92.5 
5 0 2.5 95 72.5 
8 5 0 100 42.5 
11 17.5 0 100 40 
C 17.5 2.5 95 45 
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Paris found no age related differences in these error scores and 
states: 
The errors suggest that Ss consistently employed erroneous, 
nonlogical processing strategies. (Paris, 1973, 286) 
Let us look at Table 13 from a different perspective. Since the 
subjects were required to answer true or false to the test sentence, the 
TT column of Table 13 indicates the percentage of those subjects who 
answered false when they should have answered true. Column TF indicates 
those subjects who answered true when they should have answered false. 
Column FT are those who answered false when they should have answered 
true and column FF shows the percentage of those subjects who answered 
false when they should have answered true. All this according to the 
material conditfonal interpretation of the cqnditional statement. 
From the data, I have determined the percentage of correct responses 
under the biconditional interpretation of the conditional connective. 
Table 14 shows the percentage in Table 13 that answered "correctly" 
according to the biconditional" interpretatfon. 
TABLE 14 
PERCENTAGE FROM TABLE 13 ANSWERING CORRECTLY 
ACCORDING TO A BICONDITIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONDITIONAL IF-THEN ~TATEMENT 
Grade TT TF FT FF 
2 100 82.5 75 7.5 
5 100 97.5 95 27.5 
8 95 100 100 57.5 
11 92.5 100 100 60 
C 82.5 97.5 95 55 
Total 94 95.5 93 41.5 
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The key column, FT, that distinguishes the biconditional from the 
material conditional appears to have been answered in an increasingly 
correct manner progressing from second to eleventh grade. Column FF 
remains inexplicitly modest but increasing in correct responses through 
the eleventh grade. Although no significant test '.has been·-pe:rformed upon 
Table 14 a trend is obvious.: the bkonditional interpretation grows 
stronger with age. Table 15 shows the percentage of errors on the Paris 
biconditional connective by grade and truth attribute form. 
Grade 
2 
5 
8 
11 
C 
Total 
TABLE 15 
PERCENT OF ERRORS AND CORRECT ANSWERS (IN 
PARENTHESES) ON THE BICONDITIONAL CONNECTIVE 
(Paris, 1973) 
TT TF FT 
10 (90) 5 (95) 17.5 ( 82 .5)
5 (95) 7.5 (92.5) 7.5 ( 92.5) 
15 (85) 2.5 (97.5) 10 ( 90) 
10 (90) 2.5 (9'7 .5) 0 (100) 
20 (80) 0 (100) 0 . (100) 
12 (88) 3.5 (96.5) 7.5 (92.5) 
FF 
90 (10) 
72.5 (27.5) 
50 (50) 
42.5 {57.5) 
50 (50) 
61 (39) 
Paris's analysis of the errors indicates that a trend for above-
chance errors declines to chance levels with increasing age and is 
visible for the FF items. It can be seen by comparing Tables 14 and 15 
that the subjects responded similarly to the conditional and bicondi-
tional statements. There is some evidence that indicates that a bicondi-
tional interpretation of the conditional statement increases somewhat 
with age. 
Paris notes that younger children "consistently" responded correctly 
to TI' statements and "false" to all others. He attributes this 
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in part to a "mismatch" strategy which posits that a mismatch between 
propositions always yields a "false" response. This explanation, 
howev.er, does not account for the FF responses, although Paris notes 
that while younger children viewed FF as false, older subjects ga-v:e 
responses at chance levels. 
This interpretation of FF seems to support some research into adult 
conditional reasoning. In that research, the FF form was judged to be 
irrelevant or ambiguous for the comprehension of the conditional 
statement (Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972). 
Finally, Paris attempts to explain the lack of correspondence of his 
results to the material conditional interpretation of the conditicinal 
statement by a causal-semantic notion. Here, responses to both the con-
.,ditional and biconditional propositions are to be interpreted as 
judgments of ''logical consequence," i.e., a necessary relat:ionship 
exists between the propositions' antecedent and consequence. This re-
lationship is detendned by the semantics of the sentence. Thus: 
The truth-functional interpretation of material implication 
simply does not adequately represent Ss' comprehension process 
becaus.e it explicitly ignores the semantic relationship betwen 
the elements within the proposition. (Paris, 1973, 290) 
This Paris claims, .counts against the explanatory value of formal 
logical models which "deny" the necessity of meaningful relationships 
betw~en components of propositions. 
2·. ;Roberge and Paulus (1971), Roberge (1970) 
No text
This and the subsequent three studies are patterned after or 
replicate Ennis's (1965; 1969) work. This is a study that uses class and 
conditional reasoning tests with 263 students from fourth, sixth, eighth 
and tenth grades. I examine only the results of the conditional 
reasoning test which consisted of six conditional principles and three 
No text
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content dimensions. The first five principles and three content 
dimensions are the same as Ennis (1965). All of the items are in the 
form: 
Suppose you know that 
Premise-1 
Premise-2 
Then would this be true? 
Conclusion 
B. NO C. MAYBE 
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The responses had the same meaning as Ennis (1965). There were 12 
items for each principle and total test and principle subtest scores 
were calculated by the number of correct responses, according to the 
material conditional interpretation of the conditional statement. 
Mastery of a principle was defined as correctly answering at least eight 
of the twelve principle items. This was deemed to be a sufficient 
condition for concluding that a subject had mastered that particular 
principle. 
The results of an analysis of variance for grade level and 
principles confirm Ennis's earlier results. There were significant 
differences (Fx487.81, p<0.001) among the mean principle subtest scores 
and a significant interaction (F=l2.59, p<0.001) between grade level and 
principles. 
At each grade and for all grades combined, the Forward Conditional 
was significantly easier than each of the other principles. The only 
exceptions were in the eighth and tenth grades where the Forward 
Conditional was easier but not significantly easier than the 
Transitivity principle (p).05). The fallacy principle means and the 
validity principle means were significantly different (p(.01) with the 
fallacy principles more difficult in all cases. 
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!inally, no significant differences between the principle subtest 
means existed between the fourth and sixth grades. The validity 
principles did significantly differ (p(.01) between eighth and tent'h 
grades but there was no significant difference (p).05) between the 
fallacy principles. However, between the eighth and tenth grades, the 
fallacy principles differed significantly (p(.01) favoring the tenth 
graders. Thus, growth in validity principle understanding reached its 
··peak" at about the eighth grade and growth in fallacy principle 
understanding showed a "notable spurt" between the eighth and the tenth 
grades; all this without any formal instruction in the principles of 
conditional logic. 
The study found that the concrete familiar dimension was the easiest 
of the three content dimensions and that the abstract and suggestive 
dimensions were equally difficult. The means of the concrete and each of 
the otlier two dimensions were significantly different ( p(. 0.1). Grade 
level and content dimension interaction were not signficant (p).05). 
There were no significant differences found for sex and its interaction 
with the other factors. In general, the findings of this study tended to 
confirm the results of the Ennis ( 1965) study. 
No text
3. Berzonskz and Ondrako (1974) 
The authors conducted two studies to analyse the role of cognitive
style, measured by the Matching Familiar Figures test (MFF) developed by 
Kagan (1964), and deductive reasoning. 
No textNo text No text No text
Cognitive style or reflectivity-impulsivity (R-I) ••• refers to an 
individuals' tendency to pause and reflect over possible solutions 
in a problem solving situation. (Berzonsky and Ondrako, 1974) 
The measure of deductive ability used was Ennis's (1969) chemical 
test, which was administered to sixty-nine 6 and 7 year olds. Only three 
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logical principles were tested for: Conversion, Inversion and Contrapositon. 
One of the objectives of the study was to replicate Ennis's findings. 
Item content, suppositional and factual dimensions showed no signtficant 
differences (t•~98, df, 67) which is at variance with Ennis's findings that 
the suppositional items were more difficult. There was, however, a highly 
significant principle effect (F-45.70, df, 2136, p<.Ol)e All of the mean 
principle differences were statistically significant at the .01 level: 
Conversion mean°l.40; Inversion mean=2.07; Contraposition mean=3.42. This is 
in agreement with Ennis's (1969) findings. Also, no sex differences were 
found. The study did not show a significant difference be.tween R-I cognitive 
styles with respect to the logia! principles. 
The second study was similar to the first,but used the Paulus-Roberge 
Conditional Reasoning Test (Roberge and Paulus, 1971) to test for six logical 
principles and three content dimensions (concrete, abstract and suggestive). 
The subjects were 39 eleven year old/ students with mean age 11 years 5 
months. 'nlis test has already been described. 
This study found no sex differences, which confirmed the results of 
Roberge and Paulus (1971). It also found that content dimension accounted for 
significant differences (Fa4.22, df, 2, 76, p(.05) in the subject's logic 
test scores. The suggestive items were found to be significantly more 
difficult than the concrete or the abstract ones. This result is at variance 
with Roberge and Paulus's general conclusion but is consistent: with the sixth 
, 
graders considered alone. Also, the Berzonsky and Ondrako study shows that 
I 
the logical principles accounted for significant differences (F=l6.0S, df, 5, 
190, p(.01) in the test scores. 
The Forward Conditional principle was the easiest. The fallacy principles 
(Conversion and Inversion) were more difficult th.an the others. There were no 
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significant diff.erences found between the other two principles. Ennis (1965) 
found that Conversion was more difficult than Inversion. This study and 
Roberge (1971) found this not to be the case. The results of the two' studies 
eported here tend, for the most part, to confirm previous experimental
results. In addition, this second study of Berzonsky and Ondrako did not find 
a significant difference between R-I cognitive styles with respect to the 
logical principles. 
4. Eisenberg and McGinty (1974) 
This study tried to determine whether maturation enables a person to 
reason "more logically" from worded premises. A test of 30 sentential logic 
items was constructed to measure five logical principles (6 items per 
No text
principle). We will examine only the three conditional principles: Forward 
Conditional (I), Conversion (II) and Contrapositon (III). The test was 
similar to Ennis's (1965) test. The form of the items was: 
Pre,mise-1 
Prem.se-2 
Conclusion?
A. t:ES B. NO C. MAYBE 
Premise-1 is an if-then conditional statement. Two of the six questions 
for each principle have both antecedent and consequent affirmatively worded 
' ' 
I, (A). Two questions have one part affirmatively worded and the other. part 
negatively worded (A&N). The remaining two questions have both antecedent and 
consequent negatively worded (N). Examples appear in Table 16. 
No text
\ 
No text
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Principle 
I 
II 
III 
A&N 
N 
TABLE 16 
EXAMPLE QUESTIONS 
Example 
If John is big, then Jane is big. 
John is big. 
Is Jane big? 
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If it is a black cat, then it is not an old cat. 
It is not an old cat. 
Is it a black cat? 
If there is not a red wagon, there is not a blue 
bike. 
There is a blue bike. 
Is there a red wagon? 
The subjects were 50 second grade, 50 third grade children, 89 college 
elementary education majors in the first (MA 150) of a two course sequence in 
ma.thematics and 65 elementary education majors in the second sequence (MA 
151) of the course. A unit in logic was not part of this two sequence course. 
i.Ul test questions we re read to the subjects who had a copy of the test in 
front of them. Table 17 summarizes the significant differences between the 
school children and the prospective teachers on the three logial principles 
tested. 
Second Grade 
Third Grade 
MA 150 
TABLE 17 
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETJEEN CHILDREN AND COLLEGE 
STUDENTS ON DIFFERENT LOGICAL PRINCIPLES 
Third Grade MA 150 
I, II, III 
I, III 
MA 151 
I, II, III 
I, II, III 
Note: (----) means not statistically significant at the .05 level. The 
presence of a principle indicates significance at the .05 level. 
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All significant differences favored the pre-teachers. Note that there is 
no significant difference between the grade school children and the pre-
teachers on the Conversionprinciple (a fallacy item). Table 18 shows the 
results of the semantic form of the test items. 
TABLE 18 
PERCENT CORRECT RESPONSES BY PRINCIPLE, SEMANTIC. 
FORM AND GRADE 
\ 
Principle 
I II III 
Grade Grade MA MA Grade Grade MA MA Grade Grade MA MA 
2 3 150 151 2 3 150 151 2 3 150 151 
A 48 38 88 91 16 19 No text22 32 36 52 69 65 
MN 63 56 95 97 23 31 30 37 39 42 67 72 
N 34 49 90 89 14 22 35 41 26 35 49 52 
maturation seemsto be important only in Items I and III. Both grade 
schoolers and pre-teacherstend to make similarkinds of logical errors within 
No textNo textNo text
different categories. 
Here and in the previous three studies, the material conditional
interpretation was utilized as the standard measure of correct reasoning. It 
No textNo textNo textNo textNo textNo te t No text No textNo ext No text No text
No text
is not possible, given the data reported in these studies, to perform an 
alternative analysis using the biconditional as the standard measu;e. It 
No text
should be noted, however, that the fallacy items seem to be more difficult No textNo text No textNo textNo textNo text No text No text
No textthan the validity items, and on the whole, tend to elicit improved 
performance with age. 
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5. Howell (1967) 
This study examined subject recognition of selected inference 
patterns of conditional reasoning in the absence of explicit training in 
logic. Five of the ten patterns correspond to the inference patterns we 
have previously examined: Forward Conditional, Inversion, Conversion, 
and Contraposition. Howell's sample consisted of 164 secondary level 
students {grades 7, 8 and 9), enrolled in an accelerated college 
prepatory mathematics program who had no prior training or instruction 
in logic. He created a measure to test whether his subjects could 
"recognize" the correct use of certain patterns of inferential reasoning 
and whether subjects in one grade "out-perform" those in any other 
grade. 
The test was divided into three parts. Partts I and II tested 
familiar and abstract content, respectively. Part III used abstract 
symbols (as in Part II), but substituted De'Morgan's Law equivalences 
0 
for "and" and "or" propositions. The types of arguments we are 
interested in were unaffected. Two items for each inference pattern per 
test part gave a total of 6 items per pattern of inference. Mastery of 
an inference pattern required 5 or 6 correct answers. The conclusions of 
each pattern were randomly chosen to follow logi~ally or not follow 
logically. No attempt was made to vary the -negation of premises. 
Students in the study could answer "YES" or answer "NO" when asked 
whether the conclusion followed from the premises (which were to be 
assumed true) • 
' Howell found that over 90% of the subjects in each grade mastered 
the Forward Conditional principle; 39.6, 40.4 and 77.8 percent mastered 
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Contraposition in grades 7, 8 and 9, respectively; no one mastered the 
fallacy principlesin any of the grades. 
If we use the criteria that if two-thirds of any one grade mastered 
a pattern, we see that Howell's results showed that students in each 
.grade understood Transitivity and the Forward Conditional and only grade 
nine understood Contraposition as well. From his results, Howell 
concluded that: No text
The students were much more successful at recognizing :valid 
inference pattern than invalid ones. In fact, not one student 
correctly responded to five or six of the six occurrences of either 
of the invalid patterns. (Howell, 1967, 82) 
Finally, Rowell found that the ability to infer valid conclusions 
increased slightly by grade and that there was no significant effect of-
6. Gardiner (1966) 
This study tested 277 subject in grades 4 through 13, on 14 rules 
of logic comprising 6 different content areas. The subjects had no 
previous logic instruction and no demographic information was reported. 
We are concerned here with only 4 logic principles which were worded in 
a fashion similar to Ennis (1965). Mastery ("understanding") of a 
logical principle is defined operationally as scoring 5 or 6 correct out 
of the 6 items per principle. A subject·had a "misunderstanding" of a 
principle when she makes the.!!!!!!. response to at least 5 out of 6 items 
within.a set that is keyed incorrect. Table 19 shows the percent of 
subjects in each grade group who have mastered each principle. Grades 
were collapsed in pairs to increase the number of subjects within each 
group. 
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TABLE 19 
PERCENT UNDERSTANDING AND NON-UNDERSTANDING OF PRINCIPLES 
Conditional Principle 
Forward 
Grade Conditional Inversion Conversion Contra.position 
A B C A B C A B C A B C 
4&5 59 0 2 4 24 2 43 0 0 8 16 0 6&1 79 0 2 0 21 2 45 0 0 4 23 0 
8&9 89 0 0 2 39 4 63 0 4 0 48 0 
10&11 99 0 0 0 28 20 43 0 30 0 47 9 
12&13 100 0 0 0 19 31 26 0 38 0 45 5 
Mean 
Correct 86 12 15 36 
Note: A="YES, .. B="NO, " C="MAYBE'" answer. Underline indicates 
correct understanding. Numbers not underlined indicate mis-
understandings 
Note the great difficulty that the subjects have in mastering the 
fallacy principles. If we use the biconditional as our criterion 
standard, then columns Band A under Inversion and Conversion, 
respectively, represent ''understanding." Now, with the exception of 
grades 12 and 13, the biconditiona.l interpretation score is greater than 
the material conditional interpretation score and decreases with 
increasing grade after grades 8 and 9. 
7. Paulus (1967) 
This study measures differential performances between deducing 
I (drawing) and assessing conclusions of conditional arguments~ We look at 
the assessing test, which is similar to Ennis (1965) and where mastery 
is set at at least 7 items correct (out of 10) for each principle. 
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A total of 165 subjects in grades S, 7, 9 and 11 took part in the 
No text
study. None had any previous training in logic. Paulus distinguished 
be.tween four different kinds of content: concrete familiar, abs tract" ( a 
combination of unfamiliar and symbolic), suggestive and negative. All 
but negative are as in Ennis (1965). Negative content simply refers to 
negatively worded premises. Subjects could answer either "YES," "NO' or 
"MAYBE " when assessing the conclus;ons of the conditional. test 
arguments. 
While Paulus did not tablulate :mastery by grade level, he did find 
that subjects on the whole did better on the validity principles than on 
the fallacy principles. Scores on the validity principles were highly 
correlated among t.hemselves and near zero or negatively correlated with 
the fallacy principles. In addition, the fallacy principles were found 
to be higly correlated with each other. Paulus concludes that scores on 
validity and fallacy principles were "relatively independent " of one 
another. Even when the "MAYBE" scores were statistically partialled out 
of each principle test score, the fallacy principles still correlated 
highly with each other although they no longer tended to correlate 
negatively with the validity principles. 
I 
When grades were combined, chronological age correlated positively 
and significantly with principle subtest scores (with the exception of 
Contraposition). The type of content interacted significantly with 
mental age, and negative terms in the premise did not significantly 
\ 
a£ f ect scores. 
Paulus's data warrants the rejection of his null hypothesis that 
there is no change of deductive reasoning abilities as children grow 
older. Mental age, not chronological age is his measure. 
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When grades were combined, chronological age correlated positively and 
significantly with principle subtest scores, with the exception of 
Contrapositon. 
8. Martens (1967) 
This study used as subjects high school seniors in college prepatory 
courses. Ten inference patterns were examined of which only four are of 
interest here. None of ;he premises in the test arguments contained 
artificial vocabulary or nonsense syllables. None were contrary to fact and-
valid conclusions did not contradict common sense or previous school 
instruction .. Finally, no controversial materials were employed in the test 
items .. 
There were four questions for each logical principle. The subject could 
choose from amongst three answers: the valid conclusion, the negation of the 
valid conclusion (if the correct answer is not a "MAYBE .. response), and the 
equivalent of the "MAYBE .. response, stating that neither the first nor the 
second answers are valid conclusions drawn from the premises. Significant 
differences were found to exist (p<.01) among the mean scores of the 
principles. Inversion differed significantly from Contraposition, favoring 
the latter, and Conversion differed significantly from Contraposition, 
favoring the latter principle. In addition, mean scores for each valid 
inference pattern ( considering all 10 principles) differ significantly from 
the mean score of each of the fallacy principles. 
The results indicated that only 26% and 15% of the subjects mastered 
·1 
(three or four correct) Inversion and Conversion, respectively. However, 87% 
mastered Contra.position. 
In analyzing the incorrect responses for the fallacy principles, Martens 
found that a majority of the subjects completed the fallacious inferences of 
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denying the antecedent and affirming the consequence. For Inversion, 26% 
chose the correct response 3 or more times and 59% .chose an incorrecit 
response three or more times. Of those who chose incorrect responses, they 
chose the response that denied the consequent in a ratio of 5 to 1. -For the 
Conversion principle, only 15% chose the correct response 3 or more :;times, 
whereas, 70% chose an incorrect response 3 or more times. Of those cb,oosing 
incorrect responses, they chose the response that affirmed the antecedent in No text
a ratio of 35 to 2. Martens did not test for the Forward Conditional 
principle. 
9. Miller (1968) 
In this study, 100 8th, 10th and 12th graders were tested on 6 principles 
of inference including the four principles of conditional logic that we are 
interested in. Of the twenty items, 5 were in symbolic form and 15 were in 
verb.al form. Of the 15 verbal items, 5 had premises agreeing with physical 
world situations, 5 had premises that violated physical world situa.tions and 
5 had premises that were nonsense statements. All of the statements involved 
in each item ~re deemed unambiguous, unemotional, short and neutral, and 
were in a positive form. 
The subjects had three choices for answers. One choice was the va.lid 
No text
No text
conclusion in the valid patterns or the usually accepted conclusions (i.e., 
the conclusions that completed the fallacies of affirming the consequence and 
denying the antecedent). Another choice was the negation of the above choice 
and the third choice was that neither of the above choices "necessarily 
No text
follows." Table 20 shows mean scores for principles by grade. 
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\ 
Grade 
8 
10 
12 
No textTABLE 20 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATION (PARENTHESES) 
BY GRADE AND PRINCIPLE 
Principle 
Forward Contra-
Conditional Inversion Conversion position
16 . 25 (4 . 48) 1 . 80 (3.08) 1.96 (2.90) 14.84 (4.57) 
18.17 (3.08) 1.56 (3.16) 2.25 (4.20) 16.50 (4.25) 
18.14 (2.82) 2 . 61 (4.66) 3.39 (5.20) 15.70 (4.54) 
For the fallacy items, Miller found that the 
••• results of the analysis of the correct responses to invalid 
patterns indicate that for the vast majority of the students,.the 
analysis was-perfonned on a random error response. (Miller,1968, 
137) 
Miller reports the means and standard deviations for the fallacy items 
which were responded to in such a fashion as to commit the appropriate 
/ 
fallacies. These results are shown in Table 21. Note that these results, 
together with the results for the validity principles (Table 20) constitute 
strong evidence for a biconditional interpretation of the conditional 
statement. 
TABLE 21 
i: 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS (IN PARENTHESES) 
BY GRAI)E 
Fallacies 
Affirming the Denying the 
Grade Consequence Antecedent 
No text
8 15. 99 (3 . 84)' 15.43 (4.51) 
10 16.45 (4.47) 16 .53 (4.24) 
12 15.35 ( 5.55) 15.93 (5.03) 
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These results lead Miller to conclude that: 
Students in the eighth, tenth and twelth grades select the usual 
error responses to the two invalid patterns to about the same 
extent as they select the valid responses to the valid 
patterns •••• (ibid., 137) 
In conclusion, Miller states that: 
••• the vast majority of the students accepted the invalid 
patterns as valid. This happened bec.ause the students were. 
using an inadequate criterion for judging the validity of a 
pattern. (ibid., 144) 
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While this criterion may be "inadequate·· in the context of the material 
conditional interpretation of the conditional statement, it may be 
appropriate in a biconditional interpretation context. 
10. McAloon (1969) 
This study explores the role of logic in elementary school mathematics. 
It examines the teaching of certain principles of "logical thinking" and 
their relationship to learning certain aspects of mathematics in grades three 
and six. 
McA16on utilized four treatment groups: 
LM, in which logic was taught interwoven with mathematics; L, in 
which logic was taught separated from any mathematical 
application; I, in which teachers of this group received No text
in-service instruction in mathematics; and C, a control group 
which received no instruction in logic. Teachers in LM and L 
.received in-service. ins true tion in logic. Treatment I was 
designed to help isolate the factor of in-service training. 
Teachers in C received no in-service 1:training and students in 
this group were taught no logic. (McAloon, 1969, 159) 
The subjects were 511 students in 13 third grade classes and 589 
students in 13 sixth grade classes in white middle-class schools. The logic 
instruction consisted of class and conditional logic, particularly Forward 
No text
Conditional (Modus Ponens), Inversion and Negation. All experimental 
subjects received 16 hours of instruction. McAloon states that not much 
"implication" was taught to the third graders and only a little more was 
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taught to the sixth graders. A modified version of the Ennis (1965) test was 
used along with a measure of mathematics achievement and a final logic and 
logic-retention test. We examine the modified conditional reasoning test 
results e 
McAloon used the first seven principles in Ennis's test but chose only 
three items for each principle (mixed between the content dimensions) and 
found that the fallacy principles were considerably more difficult than the 
validity principles (unfortunately, percentages correct by grade, principle 
and experimental group were not reported). McAloon found that the groups 
taught logic scored significantly higher (p<.01) than the other groups on 
both the conditional and class reasoning tests using corresponding pretests 
or IQ scores as covariates. Although the LM group scored higher than the L 
No textgroup in the third grade and although the L group scored higher than the LM 
group in the sixth grade, on both reasoning tests, the differences were not 
significant using pretest IQ scores as covariates. 
McAloon found that there was a significant difference (p<.Ol) between 
the scores of the third graders and sixth graders on both class and 
conditional pre and post tests. Also, no sex differences were found. 
Clearly, both grade levels found the validity principles much easier than 
the fallacy principles (given a material cqndi tional scoring scheme). 
11. Carroll (1971) 
Carroll examined the effects of teaching logic on the conditional 
reasoning abilities of 9th grade low-achievers in mathematics (below the 
15th percentile in mathematics and above 1the 25th percentile in reading). 
The conditional principles tested were: Forward Conditional, Conversion, 
Inversion, and Conversion. They were tested along four content dimensions: 
concrete familiar, symbolic, misleading and removed from reality. The first 
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two dimensions are described in Ennis (1965). In the misleading dimension,
the correct response is contrary to fact and in the removed from reality
dimension, the subject is asked to imagine himself or herself in a No text
fictitious situation: 
The stranger says: "If horses are animals, the horses are green. 
Horses are not green. 
Then: •••••• (Carroll, 1971, 261 
Subjects were presented with three answers: a conclusion, the 
conclusion's negation, and '"You aren't told enough to be certain whetheror-
not ........ The blank is filled in by the first conclusion, above. The 
experimental group consisted of 48 9th grade students who were given six 
lessons in conditional logic. An alternate treatment group (of 23 subjects) 
received six lessons of instruction in probability. The control group of 119 
students received no special instruction. There were twelve questions for 
each principle and three questions for each of the four content dimensions. 
·carroll's results show that on the overall test scores, the experimental 
group where logic was taught showed no more improvement between pre and post 
tests than did the other groups, although average changes were higher for 
the experimental group (the percent of subjects showing improvement was 
subjected to Chi-squared tests of significance, .01 level). The same tests 
No textNo text
of improvements were performed for the conditional principles with only the 
Conversion principle yielding significant results, although the trends 
favored the experimental group on Forward Conditional and on Inversion. The 
co·ntrol group was favored on the Contraposition principle. 
No text
The trend on the content dimensions favored the experimental group, 
although only contrasts on the misleading category were significant. 
Carroll's subjects had much more difficulty on the fallacy than on the 
validity items. 
Robert H. Seidman 65 
Except for 'the males on the Contraposition principle, 9th graders have great 
difficulty with the fallacy as opposed to the validity principles. One 
explanation offered by Carroll for this apparent anomaly is: 
[S]tudents, in accepting the invalidity of the inverse, become more 
reluctant to accept the contrapositive as valid •o•• (ibid., 114) 
Recall that Ennis (1965) gave a similar explanation fot"his similar results. 
12 .. Ryoti (1973) 
Ryoti makes a distinction between the ''standard" conditional and the 
"generalized" conditional. The standard conditional is of the form, "if 
p, then q," where "p" and "q .. are particular propositions. The general-
ized conditional is of the form, "if p(x), then q (x)," where "p(xr' and 
"q(x)" are class statements (or propositional functions). Compare 
Examples 4 and 5 from Ryoti (1973, 8). 
If Pat is Joan's friend 
then she is going to the museum today. 
Pat is Joan's friend. 
Then, would this be true? 
Pat is going to the museum. today. 
(if p then q) 
(p) 
(q) 
Example 4o Standard Conditional Argument 
If a person is Joan's friend, 
then he is going to the museum today. 
Pat is Joan's friend. 
Then, would this be true? 
Pat is going to the museum. today. 
(if p(x), then q(x) 
( p(m)) 
(q(m)) 
Example S. Generalized Conditional Argument 
Ryoti compared 12 principles of class reasoning with 12 isomorphic 
principles of conditional reasoning. The subjects were 81 fourth graders 
and 67 ninth graders and his test consisted of 6 items for each 
principle. His results for the generalized conditional principles of 
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Forward Conditional (Modus Ponens), Inversion, Conversion and 
Contraposition showed that both grade levels had more difficulty with 
the fallacy principles than with the validity principles. Subjects did 
better on Inversion than on Conversion and better on the Forward 
Conditional than on Contraposition. 
13. Flener (1974) No text. 
Let us call the standard conditional, SS, for single statement and 
call the generalized conditional (which contains one generalized and one 
standardized statement), GS. Ryoti's (1973) study examined the GS type 
argument. Flener adds a third category of conditional, one where both 
premises are in generalized form, GG. The test items all have familiar 
content (Ennis, 1965). Subjects can answwer "YES," "NO" or "MAYBE" to 
the stated conclusions. These conclusions are of two types: an 
affirmative conclusion or a negative conclusion. Examples 4 and5 
Millustrate the differences between the two types. Flener tests for Modus 
Ponens, Contraposition, Inversion and Conversion. 
• 
p ----> q 
p 
• • q 
Ex:ample 4. Modus Ponens. 
No textWith Affirmative Conclusion 
; No text. 
p ----> q 
p 
q is false 
Example 5. Modus Ponens 
With Negated Conclusion 
I 
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Essentially, Flener is interested in three variables comprising the 
validity and fallacy principles: 
1. The number of valid inferences correctly recognized, 
2. The nW11.ber of fallacies correctly recognized. 
3. The total number of items correctly recognized. 
Three test items were constructed for each of the four validity 
principles tested and two items each for the four fallacy principle 
inference patterns were constructed. Thus, for each of the three 
categories (SS, GS and GG) a test of 20 questions is constructed. The 
three tests were then administered to 306 fifth, 305 seventh and 305 
ninth grade students. OVer the three conditional argument categories, 
the Inversion patterns were the most difficult. Of the 27 correlations 
between pattern subscores, 23 correlations between valid and invalid 
inferences were negative. All of these in the fifth grade were signifi-
cantly negative. Only 3 correlations were significantly negative in the 
seventh grade and none of the correlations between valid and invalid 
subscores were significant in the ninth grade. Flener states that: 
The results imply that in the fifth grade most of the subjects who 
were above the mean for the subscores measuring valid inferences 
tended to be below the mean for the subscores measuring invalid 
inferences. In the other two grades the near-zero correlation 
indicated that this trend still continued for many of the students, 
although it was not as prevalent. (Flener, 1974, 69) 
An analysis of the total number of correct responses for each of the 
submeasures revealed that there was no apparant pattern to the subject's 
responses to the fallacy items. Flener notes that if the students were 
randomly guessing, the distribution of t~e number of correct responses 
would be binomial. He concludes that: 
There are apparently other psychological factors which influence 
the student's choices. An investigation into reasons for the 
student's choices might give an explanation for this behavior, 
and it might also explain why the correlations between the valid 
and invalid submeasures are negative. (ibid., 76) 
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Flener's study is a source of great enlightenment, although it is"-
limited by the small number of questions for each principle. Flener 
found that there were significant differences for grade levels and test
categories for all three of the variables discussed above, although none 
of the interactive effects were statistically significant. The resul4~ 
showed that for each of the three variables, the ninth graders scored 
significantly higher than the seventh or fifth graders and the seventh 
graders scored significantly higher than the fifth graders. Of 
particular interest, however, was that the absolute increase was much 
greater between the fifth and seventh grades than between the seventh 
and ninth grades for the validl ty items subscore ( 1.10 as compared with 
0.44). There was also a much higher increase between seventh and ninth 
grade scores than between the fifth and seventh grade scores on the 
fallacy Hem subscores (1.03 as compared with 0.32). 
For a.11 of the three variables, the scores on the GG test were the 
lowest arid the scores on the GS test were the highest. These results, 
were statistically significant and were observed at each grade level. 
Considering only SS and GG, it was found that subjects were 
• ~·. better able to recognize both valid and invalid inferences 
whete the conditional premise was a generalization rather than 
a singular s ta temen t. Furthermore, when comparing absolute 
differences the difference between Test GG' and Test SS was 
greater than the difference between rest SS and Test GS when 
measuting the valid inferences (0.66 as compared with 0.09), 
but the difference between Test SS and Test GG was greater than 
the difference between Test SS and Test GG for the subscores 
using the invalid inferences (0.32 as compared with 0.13). 
(ibid., 136-7) 
Thus, for the val id inferences, thete was little difference be tween
the singular or the general conditional principles as long as the second 
premise in the item was singular. When the second premise was a general 
proposition, however, the subject's found the items to be much more 
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difficult. For the fallacy patterns, the GG subtest was the most 
difficult and the GS subtest was the easiest for all three grades. 
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Flener was able to show that mental ability was not a factor in the 
subjects' responses to the valid and invalid arguments in the fifth 
grade. Mental ability was a factor in the seventh grade for the validity 
principles with the upper ability group having significantly higher 
scores than the lower and middle groups. The middle group had signifi-
cantly higher scores than the lower group. 
In the ninth grade, for each of the three variables, there were 
significant differences between each ability level, with the upper 
ability group having the highest mean and the low ability group having 
the lowest mean. Thus, by the ninth grade, there appeared a significant 
relationship between subjects' abilities and awareness of valid and 
invalid arguments. 
Flener notes two trends in his results: 
For the valid inferences, although each was above the low ability 
group there was no significant difference be tween the middle and 
high ability groups in the fifth grade. However, the three groups 
were significantly different in both the seventh and ninth grades. 
For the invalid inferences there were no significant differences · 
in the fifth grade between any of the groups. By seventh grade the 
two upper level groups had higher scores than the low ability 
group using the invalid inferences. (ibid., 141) 
14. Kodrof and Roberge (1975) 
Twelve children (six males and six females) each from grades 1, 2, 
and 3 (36 subjects total) were given a twelve item test containing six 
Forward Conditional items and six Contraposition items. The subjects 
were all white lower-middle-class pupils in a suburban New Jersey public 
school system. Grades 1, 2 and 3 had mean Lorge-Thorndike IQ scores of 
111.73, 107.50 and 109.44, respectively. These means were not 
significantly different. 
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The object of the study was to determine the effects of the content-
relatedness of test questions and the mode of test presentation on the 
subjects' scores on the two valid inference principles. This was 
accomplished by analyzing their correct judgments and explanations df 
their answers. 
For each of the two inference principles there were three :related-
content items (i.e., '"obvious real-life association between the nouns in 
the antecedent and the consequent of the hypothetical premeise'") and 
three unrelated content items (i.e., "minimal real-life associations 
between the nouns in the two parts of the hypothetical premise"). 
Explanations for correct judgments were sorted into categories (see 
Table 22) and the subjects were informed about the correctness of each 
i tein they answered. 
Subjects were tested using a concrete materials version of the test 
(a stimulus box) and a verbal form of the test (orally). These two test 
versions were separated by a two week interval and- randomly mixed in 
order of presentation. A split-plot repeated measures statistical 
analysis design was employed. 
None' of the means of the principles by related-content type by mode 
of presentation were above 3.0 and most were below 2. 5 (out of a 
!: 
possible 6). Using Ennis's (1965) criterion for mastery, these pupils 
No text
No text
did not do very well even with these validity principles. Significant 
main effects were found for grade level (F(2,33)=3.54, p<.05) and post 
hoc comparisons showed a significant difference (p<.05) between the 
,,I 
smeans of the first and third graders. Significant main effects were 
found for mode of presentation (F(l,33)•9.22, p<.Ol) which favored the 
concrete presentation form. The subjects found the Modus Ponens items 
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l. 
2. 
3. 
s. 
6. 
TABLE 22 
EXPLANATION CATEGORIES 
(condensed from Kodrof and Roberge, 1975) 
Verbalization deficits, in which the subject demonstrates 
an inability to describe the thinking which led to his 
response. 
Memory deficits, in which the subject erroneously repeats 
a given premise or loses his train of thought. 
Arbitrary explanations, in which reasoning is not based 
on facts given in the problem. 
Structural deficits, in which the subject usually gives 
evidence that he is aware, or becoming aware, of the 
structure of conditional logic, but his response is 
incomplete and cannot be classified as adequate 
conditional reasoning. 
Conditional reasoning, in which an understanding of 
conditional reasoning is suggested by the repetition of 
the hypo the tic al premise or both premises. The subject's 
response must include "if" or "if ••• 'then." 
Patterened explanations, in which the subject attempts to 
organize the information presented to him by establishing 
a pattern. The subject must refer to at least three terms 
in the test item for a response to be coded as patterned. 
significantly easier than Modus Tollens items (F(l,33)=19.12, p<.Ol). 
71 
An examination of the simple main effects for the interaction 
between grade level and principles showed that third graders scored 
significantly higher (p<.01) than first graders on Contraposition items 
and that first graders found the Forward Conditional items significantly 
easier (p(.01) than the Contraposition items. 
The data suggested that exposure to the concrete materials test 
prior to the verbal test improved the la t'ter scores. But taking the 
verbal test first did not improve subsequent concrete test scores. 
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An examination of the frequencies of explanation type for each of 
the logical principles reveals some interesting results. Even though 
many of the children made correct judgments only a few of their 
explanations indicated a .. conditional reasoning" explanation categon,. 
In fact, in all of the principles by grades (except Forward Conditional, 
grade 2), the conditional reasoning explanation frequency was the 
lowest. In all of the principle by grades the " patterned explanation "
frequencies were by far the highest. This is an important result and can 
be interpreted to support a transductive reasoning type explanation for 
logical performance on this measure. Also, there were " appreciable" 
increases in "structural defects" frequencies for Contraposition items 
by grade. Finally, there were negligible differences in types of 
explanation by the related and unrelated items. 
Another important finding was that there were no significant 
differences between the related and unrelated content means and the 
similarities in the types of explanations for each type of content. 
Other logical principles were not tested for. 
15. Antonok and Roberge (1978) 
The authors sought to determine the effects of inference principles 
No text
and type of content upon the ability of educable mentally retarded (EMR) 
children to judge conclusions of conditional arguments. This, and 
another study by Tucker (1971) are the only ones that I know of that 
have tested for conditional reasoning ability in. EMR. children. Tucker 
No text
(1971) showed no growth in propositional reasoning ability across ages 6 
and 8 when administered Hill's (1961) test orally. 
Here, a pictorial condit.ional reasoning test was used on 6 male and 
6 female subjects for each of three age groups (mean chronological ages 
of 11.72, 13.94 and 16.85 years with corresponding mental ages of 8.46, 
No textNo text
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9.60 and 12.08 years, respectively), testing for Forward Conditional, 
Contraposition and Conversion along four content types. 
The test items were presented in pictorial format (simple line 
drawings) to control for language and memory deficits. Answers of "YES," 
"NO .. or "MAYBE" were required as well as an explanation of the judgment. 
These explanations were sorted into the categories in Kodroff and 
Roberge (1975). The results showed that each of the validity principles 
were easier than the fallacy principle but that the means were not 
significantly different. Mastery of a principle was judged for at least 
6 correct out of a total of 8. 
The percent of subjects who were found to have mastered the 
Contraposition principle in each age group is similar to reported 
results for chronologically younger normal children (Ennis, 1965,; 
Gardiner, 1966; Kodroff and Roberge, 1975). Also, mastery of Conversion 
follows from previous studies (Ennis~ 1965; Gardiner, 1966; Miller, 
1968; Roberge, 1970), although most of these studies used paper and 
pencil tests, not pictures. There is reason to believe that picture test 
items might raise the number of correct answers (Kuhn, 1977). 
There was a lack of statistical significance in the content 
dimensions which was an unexpected result since previous research with 
normal children showed that concrete content was easier than abstract 
content (Carroll, 1975; Gardiner, 1966; Miller, 1968; Roberge and 
Paulus, 1971). For the lower two ages, the Forward Conditional principle 
' 
had the highest frequency of correct respbnses and Conversion the 
highest frequency of errors. 
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16. Wildman and Fletcher (1979) 
This experiment sets out to directly test the "biconditional 
misinterpretation hypothesis," which states that the "if-then" 
74 
conditional staternent is misinterpreted as a biconditional "if and only 
if, then" statement. (Wildman and Fletcher, 1977) . To do this, 237 students 
in grades 8, 10, 12 and 14 were administered a paper and pencil test 
consisting of questions reflecting all 16 unique syllogistic forms that 
are generated by the orthagonal arrangement of: 
(a) stating the major premise in each of the four combinations 
of positive and negative instances of the antecedent or consequent, 
and (b) stating the second premise in each of the four cases 
of affirming or denying the antecedent or consequent, (Wildman 
and Fletcher, 1979, 367) 
These sixteen unique syllogistic forms were generated for both 
conditionals and biconditionals. Subjects were divided randomly into three 
groups. Group 1 was administered a 16-item multiple-choice test of conditional 
syllogisms. Group 2 received a 16-item test of biconditional syllogisms and 
Group 3 got a 32-item test containing both biconditional and conditional 
syllogisms. This scheme permitted within subject and within experiment 
comparisons of problem solving behavior with respect to conditional and 
biconditional statements. Item content consisted of assigning "brown" and 
"square" or "black" and "circle11 as the antecedent and consequent in the 
major premise.
Groups 1 and 2 results could be combined and they were analyzed using 
I 
No textboth biconditional and conditional criteria for correctness. An error 
analysis was performed to test whether the biconditional misinterpretation 
hypothesis was adequate in explaining the "apparent logical errors" made 
on conditionally stated test problems. Of course, only the fallacy test 
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items could be used in this analysis since the validity items have 
identical "correct" answers for both conditional and biconditional 
interpretations. 
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The data gathered from the fallacy items of the sixteen syllogistic 
fonns are summerized in an aggregate fashion in Table 23. The authors 
claim that the biconditional misinterpretation hypothesis is supported since 
the biconditionally consistent responses for both the conditional and 
biconditional major premises were most frequently chosen across all grade 
levelso 
TABLE 23
PE RC ENTAGE 01 CONDITIONALLY CORRECT(C).Bi CONDITIONALLYY CORRECT (B) OR
OTHER(O) RESPONSES ONA11 DINY ANTICIDENTAND AFFIRM CONSEQUENT
PROBLEMSS WITH BICONDITIONALLYOR CONDITIONALLYSI AILEDD MAJOR PREMISES
(Wildman and Fletcher. 1979) 
-- ------------ --------
Biconditionally stated Conditionally stated 
------------------------------- -- - -
C B O ·C B O
Grade N (incorrect ) (correct) (incorrect) (correct) (incorrect) ( incorrect )
No textNo textNo textNo textNo text
8 49 10 64 27 9 62 29
10 58 10 71 20 19 71 10
12 71 14 72 14 28 58 13
14 59 25 62 12 47 47 6
The eight fallacy items were examined for Group 3o For each of the 
items,. subjects were identified who selected identical biconditional 
responses for both of the biconditionally andconditionally stated items.
In addition, subjects were identified who responed correctly to the 
biconditionally and conditionally stated items. The data are shown in 
percentages in Table 24. 
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TABLE 24 
PERCENTAGEOF SUBJECTS"(GRADES 8. 10, 12. AND 14) SELECTING(1) THE
BICONDITIONALLY CONSISTENT RESPONSE ON BOTH CONDITIONALLYl S1 ATEDAND
BICONDITIONALL Y STA TED PROBLEMS AND (2) 1111 CORRECT1 RESPONSEON BOTH
CONDITIONALLY STATED AND BI_CONDITIONALLYSTATED PROBLEMS (Wildman and Fletcher, 1979) 
Biconditional responding on both Correct responding on both 
conditionally and biconditionally conditionally and biconditionally 
stated problems stated problems 
Grade Grade 
Problem 8 10 12 14 8 JO 12 14 
2 38 90 .59 61 0 10 18 22 
3 63 90 59 .56 6 0 18 28 
6 38 .5.5 .50 28 0 1.5 27 44 
7 44 65 68 61 6 0 9 II 
IO 44 .55 18 II 0 .5 9 6 
II .56 .50 41 17 6 .5 18 .50 
14 25 35 27 17 0 5 27 II 
15 .50 80 .55 .50 0 .5 14 • 28 
All 45 65 47 37 2 6 18 t2.5 
• Percentages are based on sample sizes of 18, 16, 20, and 22. respectively, across 
grades 8, 10, 12, and 14. 
No textTh  problem numbers correspond to the cell numbers shown in Tables I and 2. 
[Wildman and Fletcher, 1979] 
Table 24 indic_ates that: 
No text
The· tendency of a given subject to select the same biconditionally 
consistent response to problems presented either conditionally or 
biconditionally varied somewhat across these eight problems. But 
the magnitude of the numbers throughout the table attests to the 
strong tendency of all subjects to give the singular biconditional 
interpretation to the two logically different sets of problems. 
(ibid., 378) 
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For Wildman and Fletcher, the biconditional misinterpretation hypothesis 
' 
is empirically verified. This is especially true for the younger subjects 
who display little functional/performance difference on the two different 
forms of syllogisms. Considering the overall performance picture on the 
conditional and biconditional problems, the subjects "simply respond in a 
generalized way" to problems that contain the words "if" and "then". For 
Wildman and Fletcher, their study shows just how "developmentally complex 
and puzzling" deductive reasoning ability is. 
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G. Analysis-III 
In these last few studies we see additional evidence for the 
prevalence of the logical fallacies in the reasoning of the experimental 
subjects. Paris postulates a "matching scheme" to help explain some of 
his results. This explanation fits nicely with the notion of trans-
ductive reasoning and with Evan's matching bias theory (below). 
The replications of Ennis's tests by Berzonsky and Ondrako, and by 
McAloon, and the Ennis-like studies by Roberge and Paulus, Howell, and 
Gardiner, all appear to confirm that the validity principles are easier 
than the fallacy principles and that the concrete familiar content items 
are easier than the other content dimensions. The studies that consid-
ered maturation generally showed a weak correl;ation of "correct .. 
responses with age. In addition, the studies by Kodrof and Roberge, and 
Antonok and Roberge seem to indicate a cognitive developmental progres-
sion suggesting a transduction explanation. 
McAloon found that logic instruction significantly affected test 
scores and that grade level also had a significant effect. These results 
were contradicted by Carroll as well as Ennis (1965; 1969). Ryoti and 
Flener showed that while forms of generalized conditionals were more 
difficult than standard conditionals, fallacy principles were more 
difficult than validity principles. Wildman and Fletcher provide a 
direct exnerirnental test of the biconditioual misinterpretation hypothesis. 
This is in marked contrast to the usual post hoc explanation of past studies. 
Overall, the studies on conditional reasoning reported in this chapter 
I 
show that, using the material conditional interpretation of the conditional 
statement as the criterion measure of correctness, subjects commit the 
logical fallacies quite consistently and succeed for the most part on the 
validity items. There appears to be some improvement with 
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age and grade level. Most of the studies show that it is easier to 
reason "correctly" using concrete familiar content; that there are no 
sex and little socioeconomic differences affecting conditional 
reasoning; that logical reasoning improves somewhat with age and that: 
there is only very limited success in teaching the principles of 
' 
conditional logic. L: 
Kuhn (1977) suggests that complicating factors in the above types of 
studies may cause subjects to perform under their "ideal competence" in 
conditional reasoning. Such factors as length and tediousness of paper 
and pencil tests might cause subjects to revert to a Rle.ss taxing" way 
of responding such as transductive reasoning or guessing. Also, extra-
logical factors might influence the interpretation of a concrete. testing 
situation. For example, in Ennis (1969), subjects might look for some 
"comprehensible way to interpret" the house apparatus. Kuhn's study 
showed that children given only 10 test items consisting of highly 
concrete and simplified pictures yielded a higher percentage of correct 
answers (using the material conditional interpretation) than other 
studies have reporteds 
Kuhn was also interested in determin~ng whether children needed to 
have mastered class inclusion, a hallmark of the concrete operational 
stage of cognitive development, before they could master conditional 
reasoning. In confirming this hypothesis, Kuhn reported that the 
children in her study initially interpr~ted the "if-thenw conditional 
statement in the transductive sense and then as the concrete operational 
stage emerged, recognized that the implication allows for the absence of 
one proposition in the presence of the other. Later on in the concrete 
operations stage, the children seem to master the material conditional 
.::obe;:-t H. Seidman
interpretation of the conditional statement. She also reported that it 
was the method of presentation and not the smaller number of test items 
that was responsible for the children's superior performance. 
Finally, Kuhn (1977) reported that with a particular test (the "bug" 
test, which is really a propositional function test) children's 
performance on conditional reasoning measures was significantly 
influenced by two essential characteristics of the formal operations 
stage of cognitive development: structured whole and combinatorial 
system as measured by the isolation of variables in a problem. 
Kuhn's results and some of the studies examined in this chapter 
provide evidence that young children .. naturally" reason in a 
biconditional-like manner and developmentally progress to the material 
conditional interpretation of the conditional statement. But, certainly 
not all progress to this state. 
Hidi and Bereiter (1981) conclude that the younger children in 
their study demonstrated that their reasoning was guided by "linking" 
together propositions belonging to the same general schema and not by 
a deductive process. In another study, they characterize as "intuitive 
responding" leading to the right answers, that which appears to be 
propositional reasoning. (Bereiter and Hidi, l977). 
Many of the studies considered in th'is chapter seem to indicate 
that this biconditional-like reasoning may be due to a transductive 
mental structure that is opertive. Ennis (1976) is correct in pointing 
out that we should not confuse transduction with biconditional reason-
ing. One of the defining characteristics of transduction is that it is not 
deduction. Biconditional reasoning is ~eduction. 
Ennis also warns that to attribute the presence of transduction in 
concrete and even formal operational children, due to what Piaget terms 
"vertical decalage," may be stretching Piaget's theory a bit too far. 
It is not clear, however, just how the presence of transduction over 
three developmental stages affects the theory, if at all. This question 
must await further testing and theory synthesis. 
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Since, by its very nature, a formal rule system cannot be said to 
underlie t;ransduc.tive reasoning, I have called its manifestation in 
conditional reasoning "biconditional-like." Kuhn's suggestion that 
certain tests or testing situations trigger a regression to transduction 
(and hence a biconditional-like interpretation of the conditional 
statement) is an .intriquing thought since there is some evidence that
cognitive state development is explanatorily more appropriate than a 
linguistic explanation for the development of conditional reasoning 
abilities (see Staudenmayer and Bourne, 1977). 
H. Conclusion 
It seems clear that while for many skills, establishing criteria for 
successful performance is rather straightforward, utilizing "appro-
priate" canons of formal logic as criteria for conditional reasoning 
performance is not as simple a matter. The empirical evidence reported 
in this chapter lends support to the use of a biconditional-like (or 
"material equivalence"), rather than a material conditional, interpre-
tation as the standard of logical competence with regard to "if-then" 
conditional statements expressed in ordinary language. 
There appears to be a strong tendency, over a wide age range, for 
persons to commit the fallacies of conversion and inversion which 
suggests that the conditional statement is thought to imply its converse 
and its obverse, respectively. Thus, someone who asserts the conditional 
' statement "If you eat your lunch, then !YOU can p!ay" is committed to the 
truth of p--)q as well as to the truth of p-)q (where p and q 
stand for the antecedent and consequent of the assertion, respectively). 
We can say that the assertion promises p--->q and suggests or invites the 
inference, p-->q. 
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In an even more radical 
view, we can reject the bivalent nature of the propositional 
calculus when applied to ordinary discourse. Quine points out that the 
ordinary conditional statement is really nothing more than a conditional 
assertion (rather than the assertion of a conditional) and that should 
the antecedent turn out to be false, it is as if the assertion was never 
made (Quine, 1972). This view leads to an entirely different truth table 
for the conditional statement. See Table 25. 
TABLE 25 
DEFECTIVE LOGIC INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONDITIONAL STATEMENT 
p Q p ----> Q 
T T T 
T F F 
F T Irrelevant 
F F Irrelevant 
A fascinating series of studies by Wason and his colleagues lends 
empirical support to the altered truth table shown in Table 25. These 
studies are reviewed and analyzed in Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972). 
Although a great number of variations of the primary study have been 
created, the basic experiment remains the same: 
Subjects are given a rule that concerns a set of cards that have 
letters written on one side and numbers on the other. The rule 
is: "If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even 
number on the other side." The subject is shown four cards that 
display on their visible sides a vowel ( p), a consonant (p). 
an even number (q) and an odd number (q). The subject is 
asked which card or cards they need to turn over in order to 
test the truth or falsity of the rule. 
Of course, under the material conditional interpretation of the 
rule, only the cards showing p and q need to be turned over. However, 
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it was found (and subsequently verified in a variety of repliciation$) 
that the subje~ts tended to select p and q and failed to select q. 
Wa.son explains the source of this error in the failure to appreciate the 
importance of falsification as opposed to verification. The subjects 
have a verification bias since their choices provide more chance of 
No text. 
getting the confirming disjunct, p.q, than the falsifyirtg.disjunct, 
p.q. 
In an extension to Wason' s work, Legrenzi (1970) found that when the 
situation is strictly binary (e.g., letters are either "A" or "B'" and 
numbers are either "4" or"7"), the conditional rule tended to be 
evaluated as a material equivalence. While the Wason and Legrenzi 
results are interesting in and of themselves, Evans (1972a) has 
discovered a powerful operational (or task) variable which appears to 
explain Wason's results without resorting to the verification bias 
theory. Evan's explanation is important because, like transductive 
No text
reasoning, it is non-logical, and actually parallels the transductively 
induced biconditional-like interpretation of the conditional statement. 
Evans (1972b) attempted to elicit "psychological truth tables'" by 
asking subjects to const;nict verifying a~d falsifying cases of 
conditional rules via the Wason card game. Evans systematically varied 
the ·presence and the absence of negative components in these rules and 
No text
found that his subjects tended to choose values which "matched rather 
than altered'" the values named in the rules themselves, irrespective of 
the presence of negatives. Evans noted: 
The construction of cases containing a falsified antecedent, argued 
by Wason (1966) to be psychologically irrelevant to the truth of a 
conditional rule, was almost entirely determined by matching. 
(Evans, 1972b, 195) 
In another experiment, Evans and Lynch (1973) found that the 
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selection of .ill of the four logical alternative answers were "largely 
determined by matching." There is some correspondence between these 
results and those of Paris (1973). 
Evan's work shows that his subjects' reasoning capabilities, with 
respect to the card problem, are extra-logical. This provides an added 
warning against classifying reasoning behavior as "correct" or 
"incorrect" according to some rule of formal logic. Evidence of a 
"matching bias," lends support to a non-logical transductively induced 
biconditional-like interpretation of conditional statements. The Wason, 
Evans, and Legrenzi experiments were performed upon adult subjects which 
lends support to the idea of vertical decalage with respect to the 
appearance of transductive reasoning. 
It is true, of course, that in ordinary discourse, conditional 
connectives usually function to establish semantic relations between 
sentential components. Thus, while conditional connectives may relate 
truth-values of propositions, they may violate rules which govern 
cohesion ·of d1scourse; For instance, in ordinary usage, the "if-then" 
conditional serves both to express material conditional and equivalence 
meanings: "If this is a cat, then it is an animal" and "If she is 18 or 
older, then she is entitled to vote," respectively. 
The propositional calculus merely analyses statements according to 
their logical forms and ignores their specific content. It is not with-
in the realm of this review to consider the effects of content other than 
some of the content dimensions reported in this chapter. It is interest-
ting to note that Evans and Newstead (1977) presents evidence that the 
temporal ordering of antecedent and consequence in the conditional 
statement significantly affects the correctness of response for adult 
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college level reasoners. 
This -report has examined considerable evidence supporting a 
biconditional-like interpretation of the conditio11al statement which 
could reflect a transductive reasoning paradigm cutting across 
developmental stages in an extinguishing fashion and which may reappear 
due to. a number of conjectured factors. It appears that any attempt 
to teach conditional logic principles runs up against a non-logical 
structure, yet, the empirical evidence shows that some logic is under-
5 
stood logically and some logic has been taught. Clearly, the criteria 
used to judge correct and incorrect utilization of the principles of 
conditional logic is critical. 
1.· 
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1. 
2. 
NOTES 
Much of the empirical research in this area has been heavily 
influenced by Jean Piaget's theories and models of cognitive 
development. Piaget's psychological theories are embedded within 
a genetic epistemological framework that seeks to account for·, 
amongst other things, the ontogenesis of logical reasoning from 
birth to adulthood. His theories also attempt to account for non-
logical "reasoning" (e.g., transductive reasoning). Although 
Piaget does not explicitly discuss the child's verbal or written 
· ability to utilize correctly the principles of conditional logic, 
some researchers have interpreted his work to suggest that prop-
ositional reasoning is not possible until age 11 or 12. 
Piaget's theory as it applies to the ontogenesis of deductive 
necessity and self-evidence forms a theoretical background for much 
of the research done in the area of human reasoning ability. Unfor-
tunately, a complete account of it is not readily accessible in any 
one. primary or secondary published- source. It is scattered through-
out Piaget's writings and addressed piecemeal by some of his inter-
preters. Such an account is, however, attempted in Seidman (1986). 
I assume that the reader is familiar with the terminology of 
propositional logic and with the notational shorthand: "p -> q" for 
"if p then q". 
I No text
3. Mason (1979) identifies and contrasts three different approaches 
4. 
to the study of logical thinking. They are: the logical structure 
approach, the Piagetian approach, and the information processing/ 
memory approach. 
See Hardar and Henkin (1978) and Hardar (1977, 1978) for an 
example of the considerations and limitations in developing a measure-
ment instrument (e.g., the role of negation, content effects and the 
relations between symbolic logic and the process of psychological 
reasoning). Also, see Mason (1979) for an example of an open-ended 
assessment tool. 
5. 
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NOTES 
Could it be that teaching method and/or medium might be the 
key to successfully learning logical principles? Conventional 
wisdom has it that learning computer programming, with its logical 
structure and "if-then" conditional branch statements, might 
constitute indirect instruction in logical principles. 
According to Piaget's theory of cognitive development, logical 
necessity and self-evidence develop ontogenetically and there exists 
a crucial difference between the concrete operational and formal 
operations stages of development. The transition between these 
two stages (at about 11-12 years) signals the substitution of 
deduction for experience. Deduction is now able to deal with pure 
hypotheses, whereas in the concrete operational stage it was limited 
by concrete objects and sense experience. The formal operational 
child is able to reasori deductively about abstract propositions. 
There is some conjecture that the transition between the two stages 
is aided by certain kinds of "problem circumstances" that help to 
trigger the process of reflective abstraction which is the driving 
mechanism in the transitional stage. Hunt (1961), calls this the 
problem of the "match". 
Could computer programming provide such a "problem circum-
stance"? See Seidman (1981) for an experimental study addressing 
this question for the LOGO programming language. Ennals (1984) and 
Ennals and Briggs (1985) investigate the teaching of an artificial 
intelligence Fifth Generation computer language to young children 
No text
as an aid to logical thinking. 
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APPENDIX A 
No text
I 
TABLE A-1
No textLOGICAL FORM OF ITEMS IN THE CORNELL CONDITIONAL REASONING TEST, FORM X 
(from Ennis, 1965, IV-4) 
Item 
Group 
Princi-
ple(s) 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 No text 4 
Basic Form which was used 
for the first two concrete 
familiar items (CFl and 
CF2), the symbolic item 
(SY) and the suggestive 
item (SU) 
If p, then q 
p 
: q 
If p, then q 
not p 
: not q
If p, then q 
q 
: p 
If p, then q 
not q 
:p 
I 
Answer 
for 
Basic 
Form 
Yes 
Maybe 
Maybe 
No 
Form of CF3 
If p, then q 
p 
: not q 
Same as 
basic form 
Same as 
basic form 
If p, ·then q 
not q 
: not p 
Answer 
to 
CF3 
No 
Maybe 
Maybe 
Yes 
Form of CF4 
(Same answer as 
basic form) 
not p 
If not p, then q 
: q 
p 
If not p, then q 
: not q 
q 
If not p, then q 
: not p 
not q 
If not p, then q 
: not p 
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TABLE A- 2 
MEAN DIFFICULTY AND DISCRIMINATION INDICES For
THE CORNELL CONDITIONAL REASONING TEST 
BASED UPON PRE-TEST OF LDT'S, LNDT-l'S AND LNDT-2 ' S COMBINED 
(Ennis, 1965, IV-30) 
Mean Difficulty Indices Mean Discrimination Indices 
Grade 5 7 9 11 5 7 9 11 
N = 102 99 80 78 102 99 80 78 
Item 
Group 
1 71.4 74.7 77 .3 78.8 37.0 32.1 18.9 34.9 
2· 22.7 27.4 24.8 35.3 -17.9 16.7 5.3 27.8 
3 17.7 26.8 31.5 35.7 -13.0 6.2 3.8 29.4 
4 55.7 68.7 59.6 65.0 50.0 33.9 24.2 25.4 
CF 48.9 55.4 55.2 61.8 23.2 26.3 19.4 32.0 
SY 48 .1 55.8 53.4 59.5 29.0 26.5 21.2 19. l 
SU 41.3 53.4 53.3 59.9 34.3 26.5 22.3 31.8 
Mean over 
all items 47.5 55.8 54.6 61.5 28. 1 27.0 19.8 29 .1 
Mean Discrimination Index for All Grades on Total Test: 26.0 
Total N = 359 
Robert H. Seidman 
TABLE A-3 
MEAN CHRONOLOGICAL AGE; IQ; ESTIMATED MENTAL AGE; 
AND TOTAL, COMPONENT, AND ITEM GROUP CONDITIONAL REASONING 
PRE-TEST SCORES; BY GRADE FOR ALL SUBJECTS GROUPED TOGETHER 
(adapted from Ennis, 1965, V-10) 
Grade 
N = 
Chronological Age (mos.) 
IQ 
Estimated Mental Age 
(mos.) (CA x IQ/100 
before rounding) 
Total Score* 
Component** 
CF 
SY 
SU 
Item Group** 
1 
2 
3 
4 
05 
102 
129 
108 
139 
'42.4 
23.3 
5.8 
4.6 
4.3 
1.4 
1.2 
3.3 
Conditional Reasoning 
07 09 
99 80 
153 
117 
179 
51. 7 
27.1 
6.7 
6.0 
4.5 
1. 7 
1.6 
I 
4.1
184 
110 
201 
55.3 
29.0 
6.5 
6.4 
4.9 
2.1 
2.1 
3.8 
11 
78 
203 
109 
220 
56.6 
29. 5 
7.2 
6.4 
4.7 
2.2 
2.0 
3.9 
*Total score ( for all 12 item groups) was calculated using scoring 
formula: R-W/2 + 27. 
**Component and Item Group scores are number of right answers. 
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TABLE A-5 
No textPERCENT MEETINGTHE SUFFICIENT CONDITIONAND THE 
PERCENT FAILING TO MEET THE NECESSARYCONDITION FOR MASTERY OF 
EACFI PRINCIPLE AT EACH GR.ADE LEVEL ON THE CONDITIONAL REASONING TEST 
(from Ennis, 1965, V-18) 
Grades
N = 
I tem
Group
1 
2 
3 
4 
05 
102 
51 
3 
2 
30 
fercent Mee ting the 
sufficient Condition 
07 
99 
56 
6 
3 
41 
09 
80 
66 
5 
4 
35 
11 
78 
62 
12 
3 
35
No text
Percent Failing to Meet 
the Necessary Condition 
05 
102 
30 
92 
94 
54 
07
99 
26 
80 
92 
36 
09 
80 
21 
90 
89 
41 
11 
78 
22 
73 
85 
40 
A-4 
TABLE A-5 
DESCRIPTION OF ITEMS ON THE SMITH-STURGEON CONDITIONAL REASONING TEST 
(Ennis, 1969, 41a) 
Principle 
Inversion 
Conversion 
Contraposition 
Logical Form 
of Items
If p, 'then q 
not p 
. ? 
. . 
No textIf p, then q 
q 
• ? 
. . 
If p, then q 
q 
. ? 
. . 
Al terna ti ve 
Answers 
q 
not q 
maybe 
p 
not p 
maybe 
p 
not p 
maybe 
Item 
5 
6 
11 
12 
17 
18 
1 
2 
No text7
8 
15 
16 
3 
4 
9 
10 
19 
20 
Content of Items 
Part of 
Test 
Chemicals 
Chemicals 
Chemicals 
Chemicals 
House 
House 
Chemicals 
Chemicals 
Chemicals 
Chemicals 
House 
House 
Chemicals 
Chemicals. 
Chemicals 
Chemicals 
House 
House 
--
Form 
Supposi tional 
Factual 
Suppositional 
Factual 
Supposi tional 
Factual 
Suppositional 
Factual 
Suppositional 
Factual 
Suppositional 
Factual 
Suppos i tional 
Factual 
Supposi tional 
Factual 
Supposi tional 
Factual 
lThe three alternatives presented to the child are given and the correct one is 
underlined. 
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TABLE A-6 tH
. 
MASTERY OF FOUR BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CONDITIONAL LOGIC S
(Ennis, 1969, 54a) Seiid
J 
n
Inversion Conversion Contraposition 
Non- Non- Non-
Mastery ? Mastery Mastery ? Mastery Mastery ? Mastery 
(5-6) (4) (2-3) (0-1) (5-6) (4) (2-3) (0-1) (5-6) (4) (2-3) (0-1) 
C 
N = 30 6 6 7 11 0 7 8 15' 12 7 7 4 
Gradel E 
N = 30 4 6 8 12 0 5 9 16 12 9 6 3 
Combined 
N = 60 10 12 15 23 0 12 17 31 24 16 13 7 
C 
N = 28 12 5 l 10 3 9 4 12 18 8 2 0 
Grade 2 E No text
N = 30 5 4 10 11 0 6 7 17 14 7 7 2 
Combined No text
N = 58 17 9 11 21 3 15 11 29 32 15 9 2 
C 
N = 29 9 6 6 8 2 8 7 12 18 10 l 0 
Grade 3 E 
N = 30 8 10 5 7 2 10 9 9 17 8 4 l 
Combined 
N = 59 17 16 11 15 4 18 16 21 35 18 5 l 
C 27 17 43 5 24 58 48 25 14 
All N = 87 (31%) (18%) (51%) (6%) (26%) (68%) (55%) (29%) (16%) 
Grades E 17 20 53 2 21 67 43 24 23 
Combined N = 90 (19%) (22%) (59%) (2%) (23%) (75%) (48%) (27%) (25%) 
Total 44 37 96 7 45 125 91 49· 37 
N = 177 (25%) (20%) (55%) (4%) (25%) (61%) (51%) (28%) (21%) AI 
Note: A score of 5 or 6 resulted in classification under mastery; a score of 4 was judged borderline; a score of 3 -6
or below resulted in classification under non-mastery. See Chapter 4 for explanation of method of obtaining score. 
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MEAN SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS ON FOUR BASIC PRINCIPLES, 
SON SUPPOSITIONAL AND FACTUAL ASPECTS, AND ON TOTAL TEST e
(Ennis, 1969, 54b) id
ma
Inversion Conversion Contraposition Total n
(6 items) (6 items) (6 items) (24 i terns) 
Group 
Grade & No. Statistic S* F* S+F s F S+F s F S+F s F S+F 
C* Mean 1.1 1.5 2.6 .80 .90 1. 7 1.8 2 .1 3.9 5 .1 6.0 10.7 
N=30 S.D.* 1.1 1.2 2.1 .81 1.9 1.6 1.0 .88 1.8 3.2 2.5 5 .1 
1 E* Mean 1.0 1.2 2.2 • 77 • 73 1.5 1.7 2.2 3.9 4.9 5.9 10.8 
N=30 S.D. 1.1 1.0 2.0 • 73 .83 1.5 .88 • 76 1.5 2.6 2.4 4.9 
C+E Mean 1.1 1.4 2.4 .78 .82 1.6 1.7 2.2 3.9 5.0 5.9 10.7 
N=60 S.D. 1.1 1.1 2.0 .76 .85 1.5 .94 .82 1.6 2.9 2.5 4.9 
C Mean 1.5 1.9 3.5 l .1 1.3 2.5 2.2 2.7 4.9 6.6 7.7 14.3 
N=28 S.D. 1.3 1.1 2.3 \ 1 .1 1.3 2.5 .69 .46 1.0 3.2 2.4 5.5 
2 E Mean 1.0 1.5 2.5 .60 .87 1.5 1.8 2.4 4.2 5.3 6.6 11.8 
N=30 s.n. 1.1 1.0 2.0 .86 .94 1.7 1.1 .76 1.6 2.9 2.4 5.0 
C+E Mean 1.3 1.7 3.0 .88 1.1 2.0 2.0 2.5 4.5 5.9 7.1 13.0 
N=58 S.D. 1.2 1.1 2.2 .99 1.0 1.9 .92 .65 1.4 3.0 2.4 5.3 
C Mean 1.5 1.6 3.0 1.1 1.0 2.0 2.5 2.6 5 .1 7.0 7.0 14.l 
N=29 S.D. 1.2 1.2 2.3 .98 .96 1.9 .57 .50 1.0 2.8 2.7 5.4 
3 E Mean 1.5 1.8 3.3 1.2 1.2 2.4 2.3 2.5 4.7 6.8 7.3 14.2 
N=30 S.D 1.1 1.0 2.0 .90 .92 1.8 • 78 .78 1.4 2.6 2.5 4.9 
C+E Mean 1.5 1.77 3.3 1.2 1.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 4.9 7.0 7.2 14.2 
N=59 S.D. 1.1 1.1 2.1 .93 .94 1.8 • 70 .65 1.2 2.6 2.5 5.0 
C Mean 1.4 1. 7 3.0 1.0 l. l 2.0 2.2 2.4 4.6 6.2 6.9 13.0 
N=87 S.D. 1.2 1.2 2.3 .95 .99 1.9 .83 .69 1.4 3 .1 2.6 5.5 
All 3 E Mean 1.2 1.5 2.7 .87 .93 1.8 1.9 2.3 4.3 5.7 6.6 12.3 
.No textC mbined N=90 S .D. 1.1 1.0 2.0 .86 • 91 1.7 .94 • 77 1.5 2.8 2.5 5.1 
C+E Mean 1.3 1.6 2.9 .94 1.0 1.9 2.0 2.4 4.4 6.0 6.8 12.7 
N=l87 S.D. 1.2 1.1 2 .1 • 90 .94 2.9 .89 .73 1.5 3.0 2.5 5.3 A
Note: 'S' = 'suppositional 9 ; 'F' = 'factual'; 'S. D. 1 = 'estimated population standard deviation; ' C' = -7
'control'; 'E' = 'experimental' 
Compari sons .No text
-1. A. Fallacy Principles
B. Validity principles
.. 
2. A. Supposi tional Items
B. Factual Items
3. A. Inversion 
B. Conversion 
4. A. Inversion 
.No text
B. Contraposi tion .No text
6. A. Conversion 
B. Contraposi tion 
TAB.LE A-8
COMPARISONS OF CONTROL .GROUP PART SCORES 
N=87 (d.f.=86) (Ennis, 1969, 55a)
.No textmean Difference. t 
5.06
2.87 6.8 
7.93 
6.21 
0.68 .No text4.1
6.89
3.01 
0.97 5.6 
2.04 
3.01 
1.60 6 .5 
4. 61
2.04 
2.57 12.2 
4. 61. 
superiority indicated 
(all differences_ are .No textsignificant)
X (Validity _Principles ) 
X (Fae tual Items) 
X (Inversionj 
X ( Con traposi tion) .No text
X (Contraposition) 
Critical Values for Two-Tailed t Tes ts 
Degrees of 
·Freedom 
60 
120 
Levels of Significance 
.os .01 
2.00 
1.98 
2.66 
2.62 
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